Multisensory consciousness and synesthesia

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingChapter

Abstract

Suppose you hear your colleague Magdalena speak with someone in the hallway while you are reading a paper on your computer in your office. In the envisaged scenario, you have an auditory experience of the sounds coming from Magdalena’s mouth and a visual experience of the graphemes on your computer screen. These two experiences are constituent parts of the total sensory experience you currently have. They are not integrated in any substantial sense. They merely co-exist as constituents of your total experience. That is, the two states are not integrated in a way more substantial than the way any two co-conscious states are integrated into a total experience at a time.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Title of host publicationThe Routledge Handbook of Consciousness
PublisherTaylor and Francis
Pages322-336
Number of pages15
ISBN (Electronic)9781317386810
ISBN (Print)9781138936218
DOIs
StatePublished - Jan 1 2018

Fingerprint

Constituent
Synaesthesia
Consciousness
Scenarios
Sensory Experience
Conscious
Hearing
Sound
Grapheme

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Arts and Humanities(all)

Cite this

Brogaard, B., & Chudnoff, E. (2018). Multisensory consciousness and synesthesia. In The Routledge Handbook of Consciousness (pp. 322-336). Taylor and Francis. https://doi.org/10.4324/9781315676982

Multisensory consciousness and synesthesia. / Brogaard, Berit; Chudnoff, Elijah.

The Routledge Handbook of Consciousness. Taylor and Francis, 2018. p. 322-336.

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingChapter

Brogaard, B & Chudnoff, E 2018, Multisensory consciousness and synesthesia. in The Routledge Handbook of Consciousness. Taylor and Francis, pp. 322-336. https://doi.org/10.4324/9781315676982
Brogaard B, Chudnoff E. Multisensory consciousness and synesthesia. In The Routledge Handbook of Consciousness. Taylor and Francis. 2018. p. 322-336 https://doi.org/10.4324/9781315676982
Brogaard, Berit ; Chudnoff, Elijah. / Multisensory consciousness and synesthesia. The Routledge Handbook of Consciousness. Taylor and Francis, 2018. pp. 322-336
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