Moral Sentimentalism and Moral Psychology

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingChapter

12 Scopus citations

Abstract

Moral sentimentalism holds that moral sentiment is the source of moral judgment and moral motivation. It contrasts with rationalism, which puts reason in place of sentiment. Sentimentalism goes hand in hand with a virtue theoretic approach in normative ethics. In the version of sentimentalism defended here, the chief moral sentiment is empathic concern. The chaper argues that moral goodness consists in empathic concern for others. Moreover, it argues that the reference of moral terms is fixed by actual empathic reactions, and not by reactions to merely possible circumstances.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Title of host publicationThe Oxford Handbook of Ethical Theory
PublisherOxford University Press
ISBN (Print)0195147790, 9780195147797
DOIs
StatePublished - Feb 1 2006

Keywords

  • Concern
  • Empathy
  • Moral terms
  • Rationalism
  • Sentimentalism
  • Virtue

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Arts and Humanities(all)

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    Slote, M. (2006). Moral Sentimentalism and Moral Psychology. In The Oxford Handbook of Ethical Theory Oxford University Press. https://doi.org/10.1093/0195147790.003.0009