Modalism and theoretical virtues: toward an epistemology of modality

Otavio Bueno, Scott A. Shalkowski

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

12 Scopus citations

Abstract

According to modalism, modality is primitive. In this paper, we examine the implications of this view for modal epistemology, and articulate a modalist account of modal knowledge. First, we discuss a theoretical utility argument used by David Lewis in support of his claim that there is a plurality of concrete worlds. We reject this argument, and show how to dispense with possible worlds altogether. We proceed to account for modal knowledge in modalist terms.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Pages (from-to)671-689
Number of pages19
JournalPhilosophical Studies
Volume172
Issue number3
DOIs
StatePublished - 2014

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Keywords

  • David Lewis
  • Modal epistemology
  • Modalism
  • Modality
  • Necessity
  • Possibility
  • Theoretical virtues

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Philosophy

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