Abstract
We study a model of a competing population of N adaptive agents, with similar capabilities, repeatedly deciding whether to attend a bar with an arbitrary cutoff L. Decisions are based upon past outcomes. The agents are only told whether the actual attendance is above or below L. For L to approximately N/2, the game reproduces the main features of Challet and Zhang's minority game. As L is lowered, however, the mean attendances in different runs tend to divide into two groups. The corresponding standard deviations for these two groups are very different. This grouping effect results from the dynamical feedback governing the game's time-evolution, and is not reproduced if the agents are fed a random history.
| Original language | English (US) |
|---|---|
| Pages (from-to) | 493-502 |
| Number of pages | 10 |
| Journal | Physica A: Statistical Mechanics and its Applications |
| Volume | 269 |
| Issue number | 2 |
| DOIs | |
| State | Published - Jul 15 1999 |
| Externally published | Yes |
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ASJC Scopus subject areas
- Mathematical Physics
- Statistical and Nonlinear Physics
Cite this
Minority game with arbitrary cutoffs. / Johnson, Neil F; Hui, P. M.; Zheng, Dafang; Tai, C. W.
In: Physica A: Statistical Mechanics and its Applications, Vol. 269, No. 2, 15.07.1999, p. 493-502.Research output: Contribution to journal › Article
}
TY - JOUR
T1 - Minority game with arbitrary cutoffs
AU - Johnson, Neil F
AU - Hui, P. M.
AU - Zheng, Dafang
AU - Tai, C. W.
PY - 1999/7/15
Y1 - 1999/7/15
N2 - We study a model of a competing population of N adaptive agents, with similar capabilities, repeatedly deciding whether to attend a bar with an arbitrary cutoff L. Decisions are based upon past outcomes. The agents are only told whether the actual attendance is above or below L. For L to approximately N/2, the game reproduces the main features of Challet and Zhang's minority game. As L is lowered, however, the mean attendances in different runs tend to divide into two groups. The corresponding standard deviations for these two groups are very different. This grouping effect results from the dynamical feedback governing the game's time-evolution, and is not reproduced if the agents are fed a random history.
AB - We study a model of a competing population of N adaptive agents, with similar capabilities, repeatedly deciding whether to attend a bar with an arbitrary cutoff L. Decisions are based upon past outcomes. The agents are only told whether the actual attendance is above or below L. For L to approximately N/2, the game reproduces the main features of Challet and Zhang's minority game. As L is lowered, however, the mean attendances in different runs tend to divide into two groups. The corresponding standard deviations for these two groups are very different. This grouping effect results from the dynamical feedback governing the game's time-evolution, and is not reproduced if the agents are fed a random history.
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=0032648396&partnerID=8YFLogxK
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/citedby.url?scp=0032648396&partnerID=8YFLogxK
U2 - 10.1016/S0378-4371(99)00117-X
DO - 10.1016/S0378-4371(99)00117-X
M3 - Article
AN - SCOPUS:0032648396
VL - 269
SP - 493
EP - 502
JO - Physica A: Statistical Mechanics and its Applications
JF - Physica A: Statistical Mechanics and its Applications
SN - 0378-4371
IS - 2
ER -