Minority game with arbitrary cutoffs

Neil F Johnson, P. M. Hui, Dafang Zheng, C. W. Tai

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

45 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

We study a model of a competing population of N adaptive agents, with similar capabilities, repeatedly deciding whether to attend a bar with an arbitrary cutoff L. Decisions are based upon past outcomes. The agents are only told whether the actual attendance is above or below L. For L to approximately N/2, the game reproduces the main features of Challet and Zhang's minority game. As L is lowered, however, the mean attendances in different runs tend to divide into two groups. The corresponding standard deviations for these two groups are very different. This grouping effect results from the dynamical feedback governing the game's time-evolution, and is not reproduced if the agents are fed a random history.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Pages (from-to)493-502
Number of pages10
JournalPhysica A: Statistical Mechanics and its Applications
Volume269
Issue number2
DOIs
StatePublished - Jul 15 1999
Externally publishedYes

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Minority Game
games
minorities
cut-off
Arbitrary
Game
Grouping
Standard deviation
Divides
standard deviation
histories
Tend
Model

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Mathematical Physics
  • Statistical and Nonlinear Physics

Cite this

Minority game with arbitrary cutoffs. / Johnson, Neil F; Hui, P. M.; Zheng, Dafang; Tai, C. W.

In: Physica A: Statistical Mechanics and its Applications, Vol. 269, No. 2, 15.07.1999, p. 493-502.

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

Johnson, Neil F ; Hui, P. M. ; Zheng, Dafang ; Tai, C. W. / Minority game with arbitrary cutoffs. In: Physica A: Statistical Mechanics and its Applications. 1999 ; Vol. 269, No. 2. pp. 493-502.
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