Metaphysical arguments against ordinary objects

Amie Thomasson

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

12 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

Several prominent attacks on the objects of 'folk ontology' argue that these would be omitted from a scientific ontology, or would be 'rivals' of scientific objects for their claims to be efficacious, occupy space, be composed of parts, or possess a range of other properties. I examine causal redundancy and overdetermination arguments, 'nothing over and above' appeals, and arguments based on problems with collocation and with property additivity. I argue that these share a common problem: applying conjunctive principles to cases in which the claims conjoined are not analytically independent. This unified diagnosis provides a way of defending ordinary objects against these common objections, while also yielding warnings about certain uses of general conjunctive principles.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Pages (from-to)340-359
Number of pages20
JournalPhilosophical Quarterly
Volume56
Issue number224
DOIs
StatePublished - Jul 2006

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Metaphysical
Ontology
Warning
Overdetermination
Collocation
Attack
Causal
Additivity
Rivals
Folk
Redundancy

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Philosophy

Cite this

Metaphysical arguments against ordinary objects. / Thomasson, Amie.

In: Philosophical Quarterly, Vol. 56, No. 224, 07.2006, p. 340-359.

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

Thomasson, Amie. / Metaphysical arguments against ordinary objects. In: Philosophical Quarterly. 2006 ; Vol. 56, No. 224. pp. 340-359.
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