Markov-perfect optimal taxation

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

24 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

In this paper we study optimal taxation in a dynamic game played by a sequence of governments and the private sector. We focus on the Markov-perfect equilibrium of this game under two different assumptions on the extent of government's intra-period commitment, which in turn define two within-period timings of actions. Our results show that the extent of government's intra-period commitment has important quantitative implications for policies, welfare, and macroeconomic variables, and consequently that it must be explicitly stated as one of the givens of the economy, alongside preferences, markets and technology. We see this as an important result, since most of the previous literature on Markovian optimal taxation has assumed, either interchangeably or unnoticeably, different degrees of government's intra-period commitment.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Pages (from-to)153-178
Number of pages26
JournalReview of Economic Dynamics
Volume9
Issue number1
DOIs
StatePublished - Jan 1 2006
Externally publishedYes

Fingerprint

Government
Optimal taxation
Markov perfect equilibrium
Welfare policy
Dynamic games
Macroeconomic variables
Private sector

Keywords

  • Instantaneous and non-instantaneous commitment
  • Markov-perfect optimal taxation
  • Numerical methods
  • Time-consistent policies

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Economics and Econometrics

Cite this

Markov-perfect optimal taxation. / Ortigueira, Salvador.

In: Review of Economic Dynamics, Vol. 9, No. 1, 01.01.2006, p. 153-178.

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

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