La lógica y sus aplicaciones: ¿platonismo o no-platonismo?

Translated title of the contribution: Logic and its applications: Platonism or non-platonism?

Otávio Bueno, Melisa Vivanco

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle


In this paper, we examine two conceptions of the application of logic and assess their comparative merits. The first is a platonist monist conception that characterizes the logical consequence relation as an abstract relation among propositions. We argue that this proposal, which insists on logic’s topic neutrality, accommodates very well the objectivity of logic. From this perspective, there are no constraints from particular topics. As a result, we have the universality that allows us going through a wide scope of contexts where logic is applied. In contrast, a non-platonist pluralist conception is examined and it characterizes the variety of logical consequence relations as something concrete, context-dependent involved in particular cases, and topic dependent. As will become clear, this conception is particularly well suited to make room for the applications of logic. We conclude that, in order to solve the ontological debate about logic, we need to go beyond its applications.

Translated title of the contributionLogic and its applications: Platonism or non-platonism?
Original languageSpanish
Pages (from-to)19-41
Number of pages23
Issue number41
StatePublished - Sep 1 2019


  • Application of logic
  • Logical consequence
  • Logical pluralism
  • Non-classical logics
  • Platonism

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Arts and Humanities(all)
  • Social Sciences(all)

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