Legislative effects of electoral mandates

Santiago Olivella, Margit Tavits

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

15 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

Data has been taken from the Hungarian National Assembly, where the mandate type (single member district (SMD) vs. party list or proportional representation (PR)) changes for a number of legislators each term, to explore whether and how such changes lead to changes in legislators' voting behavior. When the electoral system under which a legislator was elected changes from PR to SMD, then the rate at which the legislator defects against the party line of voting increases significantly. Contrary to expectations, when the electoral system changes from SMD to PR, there is no significant change in the voting behavior of legislators. Additional robustness tests confirm these results. The lasting influence of reputations and habits may account for the asymmetric results.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Pages (from-to)301-321
Number of pages21
JournalBritish Journal of Political Science
Volume44
Issue number2
DOIs
StatePublished - 2014
Externally publishedYes

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proportional representation
voting behavior
electoral system
district
national assembly
system change
reputation
habits
voting

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Sociology and Political Science

Cite this

Legislative effects of electoral mandates. / Olivella, Santiago; Tavits, Margit.

In: British Journal of Political Science, Vol. 44, No. 2, 2014, p. 301-321.

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

Olivella, Santiago ; Tavits, Margit. / Legislative effects of electoral mandates. In: British Journal of Political Science. 2014 ; Vol. 44, No. 2. pp. 301-321.
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