Learning from one's mistakes: Epistemic modesty and the nature of belief

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

7 Scopus citations

Abstract

I argue that it is not ideally rational to believe that some of one's current beliefs are false, despite the impressive inductive evidence concerning others and our former selves. One's own current beliefs represent a commitment which would be undermined by taking some of them to be false. The nature of this commitment is examined in the light of Nagel's distinction between subjective and objective points of view. Finally, I suggest how we might acknowledge our fallibility consistently with this special attitude to our own beliefs.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Pages (from-to)157-177
Number of pages21
JournalPacific Philosophical Quarterly
Volume82
Issue number2
DOIs
StatePublished - Jan 1 2001
Externally publishedYes

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Philosophy

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