TY - JOUR
T1 - Learning from one's mistakes
T2 - Epistemic modesty and the nature of belief
AU - Evnine, Simon J.
PY - 2001/1/1
Y1 - 2001/1/1
N2 - I argue that it is not ideally rational to believe that some of one's current beliefs are false, despite the impressive inductive evidence concerning others and our former selves. One's own current beliefs represent a commitment which would be undermined by taking some of them to be false. The nature of this commitment is examined in the light of Nagel's distinction between subjective and objective points of view. Finally, I suggest how we might acknowledge our fallibility consistently with this special attitude to our own beliefs.
AB - I argue that it is not ideally rational to believe that some of one's current beliefs are false, despite the impressive inductive evidence concerning others and our former selves. One's own current beliefs represent a commitment which would be undermined by taking some of them to be false. The nature of this commitment is examined in the light of Nagel's distinction between subjective and objective points of view. Finally, I suggest how we might acknowledge our fallibility consistently with this special attitude to our own beliefs.
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U2 - 10.1111/1468-0114.00123
DO - 10.1111/1468-0114.00123
M3 - Article
AN - SCOPUS:58149508753
VL - 82
SP - 157
EP - 177
JO - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly
JF - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly
SN - 0279-0750
IS - 2
ER -