Abstract
Unlike more standard non-normative naturalizations of epistemology and philosophy of science, Larry Laudan's naturalized philosophy of science explicitly maintains a normative dimension. This paper critically assesses Laudan's normative naturalism. After summarizing Laudan's position, the paper examines: (1) Laudan's construal of methodological rules as 'instrumentalities' connecting methodological means and cognitive ends; (2) Laudan's instrumental conception of scientific rationality; (3) Laudan's naturalistic account of the axiology of science; and (4) the extent to which a normative philosophy of science can be naturalized. It is concluded that Laudan's normative naturalism is as problematic as its non-normative naturalist cousins.
| Original language | English (US) |
|---|---|
| Pages (from-to) | 295-313 |
| Number of pages | 19 |
| Journal | Studies in History and Philosophy of Science |
| Volume | 21 |
| Issue number | 2 |
| DOIs | |
| State | Published - 1990 |
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ASJC Scopus subject areas
- History
Cite this
Laudan's normative naturalism. / Siegel, Harvey.
In: Studies in History and Philosophy of Science, Vol. 21, No. 2, 1990, p. 295-313.Research output: Contribution to journal › Article
}
TY - JOUR
T1 - Laudan's normative naturalism
AU - Siegel, Harvey
PY - 1990
Y1 - 1990
N2 - Unlike more standard non-normative naturalizations of epistemology and philosophy of science, Larry Laudan's naturalized philosophy of science explicitly maintains a normative dimension. This paper critically assesses Laudan's normative naturalism. After summarizing Laudan's position, the paper examines: (1) Laudan's construal of methodological rules as 'instrumentalities' connecting methodological means and cognitive ends; (2) Laudan's instrumental conception of scientific rationality; (3) Laudan's naturalistic account of the axiology of science; and (4) the extent to which a normative philosophy of science can be naturalized. It is concluded that Laudan's normative naturalism is as problematic as its non-normative naturalist cousins.
AB - Unlike more standard non-normative naturalizations of epistemology and philosophy of science, Larry Laudan's naturalized philosophy of science explicitly maintains a normative dimension. This paper critically assesses Laudan's normative naturalism. After summarizing Laudan's position, the paper examines: (1) Laudan's construal of methodological rules as 'instrumentalities' connecting methodological means and cognitive ends; (2) Laudan's instrumental conception of scientific rationality; (3) Laudan's naturalistic account of the axiology of science; and (4) the extent to which a normative philosophy of science can be naturalized. It is concluded that Laudan's normative naturalism is as problematic as its non-normative naturalist cousins.
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UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/citedby.url?scp=0010064821&partnerID=8YFLogxK
U2 - 10.1016/0039-3681(90)90028-7
DO - 10.1016/0039-3681(90)90028-7
M3 - Article
AN - SCOPUS:0010064821
VL - 21
SP - 295
EP - 313
JO - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A
JF - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A
SN - 0039-3681
IS - 2
ER -