Knowledge-How

A Unified Account

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingChapter

5 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

I argue for a unified theory of knowledge how that is compatible with the reductionist variety of intellectualism: knowledge how is reducible to knowledge that. But, I argue, there are knowledge states that are not justification entailing and knowledge states that are not belief entailing. Both kinds of knowledge state require the possession of practical abilities. I conclude by arguing that the view defended naturally leads to a disjunctive conception of abilities as either essentially involving mental states or as not essentially involving mental states. Only the former kind of ability is a kind of knowledge state, that is, a knowledge how state.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Title of host publicationKnowing How: Essays on Knowledge, Mind, and Action
PublisherOxford University Press
ISBN (Print)9780199932368, 9780195389364
DOIs
StatePublished - May 24 2012
Externally publishedYes

Fingerprint

Mental State
Possession
Justification
Theory of Knowledge
Unified Theory
Reductionist
Conception
Intellectualism

Keywords

  • Ability
  • Conception of abilities
  • Disjunctive
  • How
  • Knowledge how
  • Primitive knowledge
  • Unified theory of knowledge

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Arts and Humanities(all)

Cite this

Brogaard, B. (2012). Knowledge-How: A Unified Account. In Knowing How: Essays on Knowledge, Mind, and Action Oxford University Press. https://doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195389364.003.0006

Knowledge-How : A Unified Account. / Brogaard, Berit.

Knowing How: Essays on Knowledge, Mind, and Action. Oxford University Press, 2012.

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingChapter

Brogaard, B 2012, Knowledge-How: A Unified Account. in Knowing How: Essays on Knowledge, Mind, and Action. Oxford University Press. https://doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195389364.003.0006
Brogaard B. Knowledge-How: A Unified Account. In Knowing How: Essays on Knowledge, Mind, and Action. Oxford University Press. 2012 https://doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195389364.003.0006
Brogaard, Berit. / Knowledge-How : A Unified Account. Knowing How: Essays on Knowledge, Mind, and Action. Oxford University Press, 2012.
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