@article{5d6c8bb4a2594bd7adf3659d2f744e9d,
title = "Knowledge, Acceptance, and Inductive Logic",
author = "Jaakko Hintikka and Risto Hilpinen",
note = "Funding Information: 21 This does not of course imply that there are no important differences between the concept of knowledge defined by means of (D2), (D.Ac) and (D.Ac.sing) and the Aristotelian conception of knowledge. 22 For systems of inductive logic based on rules of acceptance, see e.g. Kemeny [1953] and Putnam [1963]. 23 This study has been supported by a grant from the Finnish State Council for Humanities iValtion humanistinen toimikunta). The contribution of the seniorauthor has been facilitated by a Finnish State Fellowship (Va/tion apuraha varttuneille tieteenharjoittajillei. The work has been carried out independently by the junior author on the basis of suggestions from the senior author.",
year = "1966",
doi = "10.1016/S0049-237X(08)71660-4",
language = "English (US)",
volume = "43",
pages = "1--20",
journal = "Studies in Logic and the Foundations of Mathematics",
issn = "0049-237X",
publisher = "Elsevier",
number = "C",
}