Knowledge, Acceptance, and Inductive Logic

TY - JOUR

T1 - Knowledge, Acceptance, and Inductive Logic

AU - Hintikka, Jaakko

AU - Hilpinen, Risto

N1 - Funding Information: 21 This does not of course imply that there are no important differences between the concept of knowledge defined by means of (D2), (D.Ac) and (D.Ac.sing) and the Aristotelian conception of knowledge. 22 For systems of inductive logic based on rules of acceptance, see e.g. Kemeny [1953] and Putnam [1963]. 23 This study has been supported by a grant from the Finnish State Council for Humanities iValtion humanistinen toimikunta). The contribution of the seniorauthor has been facilitated by a Finnish State Fellowship (Va/tion apuraha varttuneille tieteenharjoittajillei. The work has been carried out independently by the junior author on the basis of suggestions from the senior author.

PY - 1966

Y1 - 1966

UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=77957667502&partnerID=8YFLogxK

UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/citedby.url?scp=77957667502&partnerID=8YFLogxK

U2 - 10.1016/S0049-237X(08)71660-4

DO - 10.1016/S0049-237X(08)71660-4

M3 - Article

AN - SCOPUS:77957667502

VL - 43

SP - 1

EP - 20

JO - Studies in Logic and the Foundations of Mathematics

JF - Studies in Logic and the Foundations of Mathematics

SN - 0049-237X

IS - C

ER -