Knowing versus telling private information about a rival

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

1 Citation (Scopus)

Abstract

Bagnoli and Watts (2013) show that a firm will always disclose its private information when this information solely affects its rival's product market decisions. This result is robust to different competitive scenarios (Cournot or Bertrand competition), features (product heterogeneity or private information quantity), and levels of commitment (ex ante or ex post). I highlight how this result fits in the accounting disclosure literature, describe the intuition behind the theory, and discuss its implications for future work.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Pages (from-to)59-63
Number of pages5
JournalJournal of Management Accounting Research
Volume25
Issue number1
DOIs
StatePublished - 2013

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Private information
Product market
Accounting disclosure
Cournot competition
Scenarios
Bertrand competition
Intuition

Keywords

  • Discretionary disclosure
  • Private information
  • Product market competition

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Accounting
  • Business and International Management

Cite this

Knowing versus telling private information about a rival. / Nanda, Dhananjay.

In: Journal of Management Accounting Research, Vol. 25, No. 1, 2013, p. 59-63.

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

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