Is ‘education’ a thick epistemic concept?

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

7 Scopus citations

Abstract

Is ‘education’ a thick epistemic concept? The answer depends, of course, on the viability of the ‘thick/thin’ distinction, as well as the degree to which education is an epistemic concept at all. I will concentrate mainly on the latter, and will argue that epistemological matters are central to education and our philosophical thinking about it; and that, insofar, education is indeed rightly thought of as an epistemic concept. In laying out education’s epistemological dimensions, I hope to clarify the degree to which it makes sense to regard the concept as ‘thick’. I also discuss the relationship between philosophy of education and virtue epistemology and the sense in which being educated might itself be thought to be an epistemic virtue. Finally, I urge virtue epistemologists in particular and epistemologists generally to turn their attention to questions of education, to further both the philosophy of education and epistemology itself.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Pages (from-to)455-469
Number of pages15
JournalPhilosophical Papers
Volume37
Issue number3
DOIs
StatePublished - 2008

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Philosophy

Fingerprint Dive into the research topics of 'Is ‘education’ a thick epistemic concept?'. Together they form a unique fingerprint.

  • Cite this