Introduction

David Woodruff Smith, Amie Thomasson

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

Abstract

This volume involves both disciplinary and historical issues, and aims to integrate results and methods of the two disciplines in the interest of philosophy as a whole. There has been a long-standing assumption that - for historical, methodological, or doctrinal reasons - analytic philosophy of mind has little in common with the tradition of phenomenology that began with Brentano, and which was developed by Husserl and continued through such figures as Heidegger, Sartre, and Merleau-Ponty. This volume overturns that assumption by demonstrating how work in phenomenology may lead to progress on problems central to both classical phenomenology and contemporary philosophy of mind. Specifically, the essays gathered here (all written for the volume) bring ideas from classical phenomenology into the recent debates in philosophy of mind, and vice versa, in discussions of consciousness, intentionality, perception, action, selfknowledge, temporal awareness, holism about mental state contents, and the prospects for 'explaining' consciousness.

Original languageEnglish (US)
JournalUnknown Journal
DOIs
StatePublished - May 1 2010

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phenomenology
consciousness
Consciousness
Phenomenology
Philosophy of Mind

Keywords

  • Action
  • Consciousness
  • Heidegger
  • Husserl
  • Mental content
  • Merleau-ponty
  • Phenomenology
  • Philosophy of mind
  • Sartre
  • Temporal awareness

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Arts and Humanities(all)

Cite this

Introduction. / Smith, David Woodruff; Thomasson, Amie.

In: Unknown Journal, 01.05.2010.

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

Smith, David Woodruff ; Thomasson, Amie. / Introduction. In: Unknown Journal. 2010.
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