Abstract
We model an election in which parties nominate candidates with observable policy preferences prior to a campaign that produces information about candidate quality, a characteristic independent of policy. Informative campaigns lead to greater differentiation in expected candidate quality, which undermines policy competition. In equilibrium, as campaigns become more informative, candidates become more extreme. We identify conditions under which the costs associated with extremism dominate the benefits of campaign information. Informative political campaigns increase political extremism and can decrease voter welfare. Our results have implications for media coverage, the number of debates, and campaign finance reform.
| Original language | English (US) |
|---|---|
| Pages (from-to) | 165-207 |
| Number of pages | 43 |
| Journal | American Economic Journal: Microeconomics |
| Volume | 7 |
| Issue number | 1 |
| DOIs | |
| State | Published - Jan 1 2015 |
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ASJC Scopus subject areas
- Economics, Econometrics and Finance(all)
Cite this
Information and extremism in elections. / Boleslavsky, Raphael; Cotton, Christopher.
In: American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, Vol. 7, No. 1, 01.01.2015, p. 165-207.Research output: Contribution to journal › Article
}
TY - JOUR
T1 - Information and extremism in elections
AU - Boleslavsky, Raphael
AU - Cotton, Christopher
PY - 2015/1/1
Y1 - 2015/1/1
N2 - We model an election in which parties nominate candidates with observable policy preferences prior to a campaign that produces information about candidate quality, a characteristic independent of policy. Informative campaigns lead to greater differentiation in expected candidate quality, which undermines policy competition. In equilibrium, as campaigns become more informative, candidates become more extreme. We identify conditions under which the costs associated with extremism dominate the benefits of campaign information. Informative political campaigns increase political extremism and can decrease voter welfare. Our results have implications for media coverage, the number of debates, and campaign finance reform.
AB - We model an election in which parties nominate candidates with observable policy preferences prior to a campaign that produces information about candidate quality, a characteristic independent of policy. Informative campaigns lead to greater differentiation in expected candidate quality, which undermines policy competition. In equilibrium, as campaigns become more informative, candidates become more extreme. We identify conditions under which the costs associated with extremism dominate the benefits of campaign information. Informative political campaigns increase political extremism and can decrease voter welfare. Our results have implications for media coverage, the number of debates, and campaign finance reform.
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UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/citedby.url?scp=84966587166&partnerID=8YFLogxK
U2 - 10.1257/mic.20130006
DO - 10.1257/mic.20130006
M3 - Article
AN - SCOPUS:84966587166
VL - 7
SP - 165
EP - 207
JO - American Economic Journal: Microeconomics
JF - American Economic Journal: Microeconomics
SN - 1945-7669
IS - 1
ER -