Incentivizing information sharing in networks

Jie Xu, Yangbo Song, Mihaela Van Der Schaar

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingConference contribution

2 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

For many networks (e.g. opinion consensus, cooperative estimation, distributed learning and adaptation etc.) to proliferate and efficiently operate, the participating agents need to collaborate with each other by repeatedly sharing information which is often costly while brings no direct immediate benefit for the agents. In this paper, we develop a systematic framework for designing distributed rating protocols aimed at incentivizing the strategic agents to collaborate with each other by sharing information. The proposed incentive protocols exploit the ongoing nature of the agents' interactions to assign ratings and through them, determine future rewards and punishments through social reciprocation. Unlike existing rating protocols, the proposed protocol operates in a distributed manner, and takes into consideration the underlying interconnectivity of agents as well as their heterogeneity. We prove that in many deployment scenarios adopting the proposed rating protocols achieves full efficiency (i.e. price of anarchy is one) even with strategic agents.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Title of host publicationICASSP, IEEE International Conference on Acoustics, Speech and Signal Processing - Proceedings
PublisherInstitute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers Inc.
Pages5467-5471
Number of pages5
ISBN (Print)9781479928927
DOIs
StatePublished - 2014
Externally publishedYes
Event2014 IEEE International Conference on Acoustics, Speech, and Signal Processing, ICASSP 2014 - Florence, Italy
Duration: May 4 2014May 9 2014

Other

Other2014 IEEE International Conference on Acoustics, Speech, and Signal Processing, ICASSP 2014
CountryItaly
CityFlorence
Period5/4/145/9/14

Keywords

  • distributed rating protocol
  • Information sharing
  • repeated games

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Signal Processing
  • Software
  • Electrical and Electronic Engineering

Cite this

Xu, J., Song, Y., & Van Der Schaar, M. (2014). Incentivizing information sharing in networks. In ICASSP, IEEE International Conference on Acoustics, Speech and Signal Processing - Proceedings (pp. 5467-5471). [6854648] Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers Inc.. https://doi.org/10.1109/ICASSP.2014.6854648

Incentivizing information sharing in networks. / Xu, Jie; Song, Yangbo; Van Der Schaar, Mihaela.

ICASSP, IEEE International Conference on Acoustics, Speech and Signal Processing - Proceedings. Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers Inc., 2014. p. 5467-5471 6854648.

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingConference contribution

Xu, J, Song, Y & Van Der Schaar, M 2014, Incentivizing information sharing in networks. in ICASSP, IEEE International Conference on Acoustics, Speech and Signal Processing - Proceedings., 6854648, Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers Inc., pp. 5467-5471, 2014 IEEE International Conference on Acoustics, Speech, and Signal Processing, ICASSP 2014, Florence, Italy, 5/4/14. https://doi.org/10.1109/ICASSP.2014.6854648
Xu J, Song Y, Van Der Schaar M. Incentivizing information sharing in networks. In ICASSP, IEEE International Conference on Acoustics, Speech and Signal Processing - Proceedings. Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers Inc. 2014. p. 5467-5471. 6854648 https://doi.org/10.1109/ICASSP.2014.6854648
Xu, Jie ; Song, Yangbo ; Van Der Schaar, Mihaela. / Incentivizing information sharing in networks. ICASSP, IEEE International Conference on Acoustics, Speech and Signal Processing - Proceedings. Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers Inc., 2014. pp. 5467-5471
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