Incentive design for heterogeneous user-generated content networks

Jie Xu, Mihaela Van Der Schaar

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingChapter

1 Citation (Scopus)

Abstract

This paper designs rating systems aimed at incentivizing users in UGC networks to produce content, thereby significantly improving the social welfare of such networks. We explicitly consider that monitoring user's production activities is imperfect. Such imperfect monitoring will lead to undesired rating drop of users, thereby reducing the social welfare of the network. The network topology constraint and users' heterogeneity further complicates the optimal rating system design problem since users' incentives are complexly coupled. This paper determines optimal recommendation strategies under a variety of monitoring scenarios. Our results suggest that, surprisingly, allowing a certain level of freeriding behavior may lead to higher social welfare than incentivizing all users to produce.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Title of host publicationPerformance Evaluation Review
PublisherAssociation for Computing Machinery
Pages34-37
Number of pages4
Volume41
Edition4
DOIs
StatePublished - 2014
Externally publishedYes

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Monitoring
Systems analysis
Topology

Keywords

  • Imperfect Monitoring
  • Incentives
  • Rating
  • User-Generated Content Networks

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Computer Networks and Communications
  • Hardware and Architecture
  • Software

Cite this

Xu, J., & Van Der Schaar, M. (2014). Incentive design for heterogeneous user-generated content networks. In Performance Evaluation Review (4 ed., Vol. 41, pp. 34-37). Association for Computing Machinery. https://doi.org/10.1145/2627534.2627545

Incentive design for heterogeneous user-generated content networks. / Xu, Jie; Van Der Schaar, Mihaela.

Performance Evaluation Review. Vol. 41 4. ed. Association for Computing Machinery, 2014. p. 34-37.

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingChapter

Xu, J & Van Der Schaar, M 2014, Incentive design for heterogeneous user-generated content networks. in Performance Evaluation Review. 4 edn, vol. 41, Association for Computing Machinery, pp. 34-37. https://doi.org/10.1145/2627534.2627545
Xu J, Van Der Schaar M. Incentive design for heterogeneous user-generated content networks. In Performance Evaluation Review. 4 ed. Vol. 41. Association for Computing Machinery. 2014. p. 34-37 https://doi.org/10.1145/2627534.2627545
Xu, Jie ; Van Der Schaar, Mihaela. / Incentive design for heterogeneous user-generated content networks. Performance Evaluation Review. Vol. 41 4. ed. Association for Computing Machinery, 2014. pp. 34-37
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