In what sense is phenomenology transcendental?

Amie Thomasson

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

5 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

Dan Zahavi raises doubts about the prospects for combining phenomenological and analytical approaches to the mind, based chiefly on the claim that phenomenology is a form of transcendental philosophy. I argue that there are two ways in which one might understand the claim that phenomenology is transcendental: (1) as the claim that the methods of phenomenology essentially involve addressing transcendental questions or making transcendental arguments, or (2) as the claim that phenomenology is committed to substantive theses of antirealism and the like, which are sometimes thought to follow from a transcendental approach. I argue that while (1) is appropriate, it in no way leads to conflicts with analytic work in philosophy of mind. Moreover, adopting this method and practicing phenomenology in no way commits us to claims of type (2) that might be thought to conflict with common assumptions in analytic philosophy of mind.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Pages (from-to)85-92
Number of pages8
JournalSouthern Journal of Philosophy
Volume45
Issue numberSUPPL
StatePublished - 2007

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Phenomenology
Transcendental Phenomenology
Transcendental
Philosophy of Mind
Analytic philosophy
Transcendental Arguments
Transcendental philosophy
Anti-realism

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Philosophy

Cite this

In what sense is phenomenology transcendental? / Thomasson, Amie.

In: Southern Journal of Philosophy, Vol. 45, No. SUPPL, 2007, p. 85-92.

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

Thomasson, A 2007, 'In what sense is phenomenology transcendental?', Southern Journal of Philosophy, vol. 45, no. SUPPL, pp. 85-92.
Thomasson, Amie. / In what sense is phenomenology transcendental?. In: Southern Journal of Philosophy. 2007 ; Vol. 45, No. SUPPL. pp. 85-92.
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