In Search of Intuition

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

Abstract

What are intuitions? Stereotypical examples may suggest that they are the results of common intellectual reflexes. But some intuitions defy the stereotype: there are hard-won intuitions that take deliberate effort to have, improved intuitions that contravene how matters naively seem to us, and expertly guided intuitions in which an expert in some domain guides a novice toward having an intuition that, otherwise, he or she would not have had. I argue that reflection on these three phenomena motivates a conception of intuition that emphasizes its phenomenology over its aetiology, as well as its grounding in malleable problem-solving abilities.

Original languageEnglish (US)
JournalAustralasian Journal of Philosophy
DOIs
StateAccepted/In press - Jan 1 2019

Fingerprint

Intuition
Phenomenology
Etiology
Stereotypes
Grounding
Reflex
Problem Solving
Novice
Conception

Keywords

  • dual process psychology
  • expertise
  • intuition
  • mathematical intuition
  • problem solving

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Philosophy

Cite this

In Search of Intuition. / Chudnoff, Elijah.

In: Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 01.01.2019.

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

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