Abstract
What are intuitions? Stereotypical examples may suggest that they are the results of common intellectual reflexes. But some intuitions defy the stereotype: there are hard-won intuitions that take deliberate effort to have, improved intuitions that contravene how matters naively seem to us, and expertly guided intuitions in which an expert in some domain guides a novice toward having an intuition that, otherwise, he or she would not have had. I argue that reflection on these three phenomena motivates a conception of intuition that emphasizes its phenomenology over its aetiology, as well as its grounding in malleable problem-solving abilities.
| Original language | English (US) |
|---|---|
| Journal | Australasian Journal of Philosophy |
| DOIs | |
| State | Accepted/In press - Jan 1 2019 |
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Keywords
- dual process psychology
- expertise
- intuition
- mathematical intuition
- problem solving
ASJC Scopus subject areas
- Philosophy
Cite this
In Search of Intuition. / Chudnoff, Elijah.
In: Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 01.01.2019.Research output: Contribution to journal › Article
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TY - JOUR
T1 - In Search of Intuition
AU - Chudnoff, Elijah
PY - 2019/1/1
Y1 - 2019/1/1
N2 - What are intuitions? Stereotypical examples may suggest that they are the results of common intellectual reflexes. But some intuitions defy the stereotype: there are hard-won intuitions that take deliberate effort to have, improved intuitions that contravene how matters naively seem to us, and expertly guided intuitions in which an expert in some domain guides a novice toward having an intuition that, otherwise, he or she would not have had. I argue that reflection on these three phenomena motivates a conception of intuition that emphasizes its phenomenology over its aetiology, as well as its grounding in malleable problem-solving abilities.
AB - What are intuitions? Stereotypical examples may suggest that they are the results of common intellectual reflexes. But some intuitions defy the stereotype: there are hard-won intuitions that take deliberate effort to have, improved intuitions that contravene how matters naively seem to us, and expertly guided intuitions in which an expert in some domain guides a novice toward having an intuition that, otherwise, he or she would not have had. I argue that reflection on these three phenomena motivates a conception of intuition that emphasizes its phenomenology over its aetiology, as well as its grounding in malleable problem-solving abilities.
KW - dual process psychology
KW - expertise
KW - intuition
KW - mathematical intuition
KW - problem solving
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U2 - 10.1080/00048402.2019.1658121
DO - 10.1080/00048402.2019.1658121
M3 - Article
AN - SCOPUS:85075058387
JO - Australasian Journal of Philosophy
JF - Australasian Journal of Philosophy
SN - 0004-8402
ER -