In defense of hearing meanings

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

6 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

According to the inferential view of language comprehension, we hear a speaker’s utterance and infer what was said, drawing on our competence in the syntax and semantics of the language together with background information. On the alternative perceptual view, fluent speakers have a non-inferential capacity to perceive the content of speech. On this view, when we hear a speaker’s utterance, the experience confers some degree of justification on our beliefs about what was said in the absence of defeaters. So, in the absence of defeaters, we can come to know what was said merely on the basis of hearing the utterance. Several arguments have been offered against a pure perceptual view of language comprehension, among others, arguments pointing to its alleged difficulties accounting for homophones and the context-sensitivity of ordinary language. After responding to challenges to the perceptual view of language comprehension, I provide a new argument in favor of the perceptual view by looking closer at the dependence of the justificatory qualities of experience on the notion of a defeater as well as the perceptual nature of language learning and language processing.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Pages (from-to)1-17
Number of pages17
JournalSynthese
DOIs
StateAccepted/In press - Aug 6 2016

Fingerprint

language
comprehension
Language Comprehension
Utterance
Hearing
Defeaters
syntax
experience
semantics
learning
Homophones
Language
Justification
Syntax
Language Processing
Context Sensitivity
Ordinary Language
Language Acquisition

Keywords

  • Ambiguity
  • Cognitive penetration
  • Cognitive phenomenology
  • Language comprehension
  • Perceptual learning
  • Phenomenal contrast argument
  • Phenomenal dogmatism
  • Polysemy
  • Presentational phenomenology
  • Top-down influences

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Social Sciences(all)
  • Philosophy

Cite this

In defense of hearing meanings. / Brogaard, Berit.

In: Synthese, 06.08.2016, p. 1-17.

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

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