Abstract
Gerald Doppelt’s recent ‘Kuhn’s Epistemological Relativism: An Interpretation and Defense’ (Inquiry, Vol. 21 [1978], pp 33-86) offers a reconstruction of Thomas Kuhn’s views concerning theory choice in science in which Kuhn’s ‘incommensurability thesis’, and his epistemological relativism, are defended. It is argued that Doppelt’s reconstruction fails to provide an adequate defense, and that both Kuhn’s incommensurability thesis, and his epistemological relativism, as reconstructed by Doppelt, remain philosophically unacceptable.
| Original language | English (US) |
|---|---|
| Pages (from-to) | 107-123 |
| Number of pages | 17 |
| Journal | Inquiry (United Kingdom) |
| Volume | 23 |
| Issue number | 1 |
| DOIs | |
| State | Published - 1980 |
| Externally published | Yes |
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- Health Policy
Cite this
I. Epistemological Relativism in its Latest Form. / Siegel, Harvey.
In: Inquiry (United Kingdom), Vol. 23, No. 1, 1980, p. 107-123.Research output: Contribution to journal › Article
}
TY - JOUR
T1 - I. Epistemological Relativism in its Latest Form
AU - Siegel, Harvey
PY - 1980
Y1 - 1980
N2 - Gerald Doppelt’s recent ‘Kuhn’s Epistemological Relativism: An Interpretation and Defense’ (Inquiry, Vol. 21 [1978], pp 33-86) offers a reconstruction of Thomas Kuhn’s views concerning theory choice in science in which Kuhn’s ‘incommensurability thesis’, and his epistemological relativism, are defended. It is argued that Doppelt’s reconstruction fails to provide an adequate defense, and that both Kuhn’s incommensurability thesis, and his epistemological relativism, as reconstructed by Doppelt, remain philosophically unacceptable.
AB - Gerald Doppelt’s recent ‘Kuhn’s Epistemological Relativism: An Interpretation and Defense’ (Inquiry, Vol. 21 [1978], pp 33-86) offers a reconstruction of Thomas Kuhn’s views concerning theory choice in science in which Kuhn’s ‘incommensurability thesis’, and his epistemological relativism, are defended. It is argued that Doppelt’s reconstruction fails to provide an adequate defense, and that both Kuhn’s incommensurability thesis, and his epistemological relativism, as reconstructed by Doppelt, remain philosophically unacceptable.
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=84925923021&partnerID=8YFLogxK
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/citedby.url?scp=84925923021&partnerID=8YFLogxK
U2 - 10.1080/00201748008601893
DO - 10.1080/00201748008601893
M3 - Article
AN - SCOPUS:84925923021
VL - 23
SP - 107
EP - 123
JO - Inquiry
JF - Inquiry
SN - 0020-174X
IS - 1
ER -