Honesty vs. advocacy

Kyungmin Kim, Jonathan Pogach

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

3 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

We examine the roles and values of honesty and advocacy in communication by studying two closely-related variants of the standard cheap-talk game. In the honesty model, the sender is behavioral and honestly reveals the state with a positive probability. In the advocacy model, the sender is strategic but has no bias with a positive probability. In each model, the sender is strategic and has some bias with the complementary probability. We identify the effects on communication of commitment by the honest type to telling the truth and well-intentioned manipulation of the strategic type with no bias. We also show that neither characteristic uniformly dominates the other from the viewpoints of both the receiver and the biased sender: each player's maximal expected utility can be larger or smaller in one model than in the other, depending on parameter values.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Pages (from-to)51-74
Number of pages24
JournalJournal of Economic Behavior and Organization
Volume105
DOIs
StatePublished - Jan 1 2014
Externally publishedYes

Fingerprint

Advocacy
Honesty
Communication
Expected utility
Strategic types
Manipulation
Cheap talk

Keywords

  • Advocacy
  • Cheap-talk
  • Honesty

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Economics and Econometrics
  • Organizational Behavior and Human Resource Management

Cite this

Honesty vs. advocacy. / Kim, Kyungmin; Pogach, Jonathan.

In: Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, Vol. 105, 01.01.2014, p. 51-74.

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

Kim, Kyungmin ; Pogach, Jonathan. / Honesty vs. advocacy. In: Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization. 2014 ; Vol. 105. pp. 51-74.
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