Governing buyer-supplier relationships through transactional and relational mechanisms: Evidence from China

Yi Liu, Yadong Luo, Ting Liu

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

329 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

Building on economic and social exchange theories, this study investigates the different roles transactional and relational mechanisms have in hindering opportunism and improving relationship performance in an emerging economy. Our study applied to manufacturer-distributor dyads in China and used matched survey data (225 paired sample firms) to test our hypotheses. Our hierarchical multivariate regression and semipartial correlation analyses suggest that transactional mechanisms are more effective in restraining opportunism while relational mechanisms are more powerful in improving relationship performance. This performance is improved more significantly when both contracts and relational norms are used jointly than when used separately. Likewise, opportunism is curbed more effectively when both contracts and trust are used jointly than when used individually.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Pages (from-to)294-309
Number of pages16
JournalJournal of Operations Management
Volume27
Issue number4
DOIs
StatePublished - Aug 2009

Fingerprint

Economics
Buyer-supplier relationships
Opportunism
China
Hypothesis test
Social exchange theory
Distributor
Emerging economies
Multivariate regression
Dyads
Relational norms
Survey data
Economic exchange

Keywords

  • Buyer-supplier relationship
  • Emerging market
  • Supply chain management

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Industrial and Manufacturing Engineering
  • Computer Science Applications
  • Management Science and Operations Research
  • Strategy and Management

Cite this

Governing buyer-supplier relationships through transactional and relational mechanisms : Evidence from China. / Liu, Yi; Luo, Yadong; Liu, Ting.

In: Journal of Operations Management, Vol. 27, No. 4, 08.2009, p. 294-309.

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

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