From Virtue to Freedom through Emotion

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

Abstract

Spinoza conceived human freedom as a matter solely of rationality, but an understanding of the role emotion plays in moral virtue can lead one toward viewing emotionality as also essential to human freedom. A large part of human freedom consists in our tendency to give intrinsic importance to people or things outside ourselves and take them into our lives; this sense of importance, in rich and various ways, brings emotion into the center of our lives and our freedom as individuals.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Pages (from-to)430-443
Number of pages14
JournalFrontiers of Philosophy in China
Volume10
Issue number3
DOIs
StatePublished - 2015

Fingerprint

Human Freedom
Emotion
Intrinsic
Rationality
Moral Virtue
Emotionality
Baruch Spinoza

Keywords

  • altruism
  • egoism
  • emotion
  • expansion
  • freedom
  • human lives
  • neutral motives
  • spontaneity
  • virtue

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Philosophy

Cite this

From Virtue to Freedom through Emotion. / Slote, Michael.

In: Frontiers of Philosophy in China, Vol. 10, No. 3, 2015, p. 430-443.

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

@article{93cc0ad14e9642758e0d5d6df64f8a92,
title = "From Virtue to Freedom through Emotion",
abstract = "Spinoza conceived human freedom as a matter solely of rationality, but an understanding of the role emotion plays in moral virtue can lead one toward viewing emotionality as also essential to human freedom. A large part of human freedom consists in our tendency to give intrinsic importance to people or things outside ourselves and take them into our lives; this sense of importance, in rich and various ways, brings emotion into the center of our lives and our freedom as individuals.",
keywords = "altruism, egoism, emotion, expansion, freedom, human lives, neutral motives, spontaneity, virtue",
author = "Michael Slote",
year = "2015",
doi = "10.3868/s030-004-015-0032-8",
language = "English (US)",
volume = "10",
pages = "430--443",
journal = "Frontiers of Philosophy in China",
issn = "1673-3436",
publisher = "Higher Education Press",
number = "3",

}

TY - JOUR

T1 - From Virtue to Freedom through Emotion

AU - Slote, Michael

PY - 2015

Y1 - 2015

N2 - Spinoza conceived human freedom as a matter solely of rationality, but an understanding of the role emotion plays in moral virtue can lead one toward viewing emotionality as also essential to human freedom. A large part of human freedom consists in our tendency to give intrinsic importance to people or things outside ourselves and take them into our lives; this sense of importance, in rich and various ways, brings emotion into the center of our lives and our freedom as individuals.

AB - Spinoza conceived human freedom as a matter solely of rationality, but an understanding of the role emotion plays in moral virtue can lead one toward viewing emotionality as also essential to human freedom. A large part of human freedom consists in our tendency to give intrinsic importance to people or things outside ourselves and take them into our lives; this sense of importance, in rich and various ways, brings emotion into the center of our lives and our freedom as individuals.

KW - altruism

KW - egoism

KW - emotion

KW - expansion

KW - freedom

KW - human lives

KW - neutral motives

KW - spontaneity

KW - virtue

UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=84946912631&partnerID=8YFLogxK

UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/citedby.url?scp=84946912631&partnerID=8YFLogxK

U2 - 10.3868/s030-004-015-0032-8

DO - 10.3868/s030-004-015-0032-8

M3 - Article

AN - SCOPUS:84946912631

VL - 10

SP - 430

EP - 443

JO - Frontiers of Philosophy in China

JF - Frontiers of Philosophy in China

SN - 1673-3436

IS - 3

ER -