TY - JOUR
T1 - Four strategies for dealing with the counting anomaly in spontaneous collapse theories of quantum mechanics
AU - Lewis, Peter J.
PY - 2003
Y1 - 2003
N2 - A few years ago, I argued that according to spontaneous collapse theories of quantum mechanics, arithmetic applies to macroscopic objects only as an approximation. Several authors have written articles defending spontaneous collapse theories against this charge, including Bassi and Ghirardi, Clifton and Monton, and now Frigg. The arguments of these authors are all different and all ingenious, but in the end I think that none of them succeeds, for reasons I elaborate here. I suggest a fourth line of response, based on an analogy with epistemic paradoxes, which I think is the best way to defend spontaneous collapse theories, and which leaves my main thesis intact.
AB - A few years ago, I argued that according to spontaneous collapse theories of quantum mechanics, arithmetic applies to macroscopic objects only as an approximation. Several authors have written articles defending spontaneous collapse theories against this charge, including Bassi and Ghirardi, Clifton and Monton, and now Frigg. The arguments of these authors are all different and all ingenious, but in the end I think that none of them succeeds, for reasons I elaborate here. I suggest a fourth line of response, based on an analogy with epistemic paradoxes, which I think is the best way to defend spontaneous collapse theories, and which leaves my main thesis intact.
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U2 - 10.1080/0269859031000160603
DO - 10.1080/0269859031000160603
M3 - Article
AN - SCOPUS:33646218232
VL - 17
SP - 137
EP - 142
JO - International Studies in the Philosophy of Science
JF - International Studies in the Philosophy of Science
SN - 0269-8595
IS - 2
ER -