Abstract
In this article we seek to explain the nexus of legislators and the lobbyists who vie for their attention. Prior research finds that campaign contributions do not buy votes, but they can buy access to lawmakers. Rather than conceptualize donations as a single-shot exchange of money for time, we see campaign donations as both an investment in an ongoing relationship and an expression of common underlying characteristics between lobbyists and legislators. We use the personal campaign donations of individual lobbyists in the 109th Congress to test our account. We find that for legislators up for reelection, the more connected two legislators are by common lobbyist donors, the more likely they are to vote the same way, controlling for the influence of party, geography and constituency.
| Original language | English (US) |
|---|---|
| Pages (from-to) | 224-262 |
| Number of pages | 39 |
| Journal | Interest Groups and Advocacy |
| Volume | 5 |
| Issue number | 3 |
| DOIs | |
| State | Published - Oct 1 2016 |
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Keywords
- campaign contributions
- legislators
- lobbying
- lobbyists
- networks
- roll call voting
ASJC Scopus subject areas
- Sociology and Political Science
Cite this
Financing friends : How lobbyists create a web of relationships among members of Congress oa. / Victor, Jennifer Nicoll; Koger, John G.
In: Interest Groups and Advocacy, Vol. 5, No. 3, 01.10.2016, p. 224-262.Research output: Contribution to journal › Article
}
TY - JOUR
T1 - Financing friends
T2 - How lobbyists create a web of relationships among members of Congress oa
AU - Victor, Jennifer Nicoll
AU - Koger, John G
PY - 2016/10/1
Y1 - 2016/10/1
N2 - In this article we seek to explain the nexus of legislators and the lobbyists who vie for their attention. Prior research finds that campaign contributions do not buy votes, but they can buy access to lawmakers. Rather than conceptualize donations as a single-shot exchange of money for time, we see campaign donations as both an investment in an ongoing relationship and an expression of common underlying characteristics between lobbyists and legislators. We use the personal campaign donations of individual lobbyists in the 109th Congress to test our account. We find that for legislators up for reelection, the more connected two legislators are by common lobbyist donors, the more likely they are to vote the same way, controlling for the influence of party, geography and constituency.
AB - In this article we seek to explain the nexus of legislators and the lobbyists who vie for their attention. Prior research finds that campaign contributions do not buy votes, but they can buy access to lawmakers. Rather than conceptualize donations as a single-shot exchange of money for time, we see campaign donations as both an investment in an ongoing relationship and an expression of common underlying characteristics between lobbyists and legislators. We use the personal campaign donations of individual lobbyists in the 109th Congress to test our account. We find that for legislators up for reelection, the more connected two legislators are by common lobbyist donors, the more likely they are to vote the same way, controlling for the influence of party, geography and constituency.
KW - campaign contributions
KW - legislators
KW - lobbying
KW - lobbyists
KW - networks
KW - roll call voting
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UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/citedby.url?scp=85032258908&partnerID=8YFLogxK
U2 - 10.1057/iga.2016.5
DO - 10.1057/iga.2016.5
M3 - Article
AN - SCOPUS:85032258908
VL - 5
SP - 224
EP - 262
JO - Interest Groups and Advocacy
JF - Interest Groups and Advocacy
SN - 2047-7414
IS - 3
ER -