Financial incentives and welfare reform in the United States

Philip Robins, Charles Michalopoulos, Elsie Pan

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

2 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

This paper uses a microsimulation model to ask whether welfare recipients in the United States would work full-time if offered an earnings supplement that was conditioned on full-time employment. The simulations suggest that the earnings supplement would increase full-time employment, with little additional cash transfer cost to the government. In contrast, financial incentives currently being used by many of the states are increasing employment and income, but are encouraging primarily part-time employment. Encouraging full-time employment is particularly important in light of new time limits on welfare receipt. Faced with a loss of welfare benefits, many recipients may find that part-time earnings do not allow them to be economically self-sufficient.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Pages (from-to)129-149
Number of pages21
JournalJournal of Policy Analysis and Management
Volume20
Issue number1
DOIs
StatePublished - Dec 1 2001

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welfare
incentive
reform
supplement
welfare recipient
part-time work
time
Financial incentives
Welfare reform
recipient
income
simulation
costs

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Business, Management and Accounting(all)
  • Sociology and Political Science
  • Public Administration

Cite this

Financial incentives and welfare reform in the United States. / Robins, Philip; Michalopoulos, Charles; Pan, Elsie.

In: Journal of Policy Analysis and Management, Vol. 20, No. 1, 01.12.2001, p. 129-149.

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

Robins, Philip ; Michalopoulos, Charles ; Pan, Elsie. / Financial incentives and welfare reform in the United States. In: Journal of Policy Analysis and Management. 2001 ; Vol. 20, No. 1. pp. 129-149.
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