Abstract
We present a study of a dynamical quantum game. Each agent has a 'memory' of her performance over the previous m timesteps, and her strategy can evolve in time. The game exhibits distinct regimes of optimality. For small m the classical game performs better, while for intermediate m the relative performance depends on whether the source of qubits is 'corrupt'. For large m, the quantum players dramatically outperform the classical players by 'freezing' the game into high-performing attractors in which evolution ceases.
Original language | English (US) |
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Pages (from-to) | L547-L552 |
Journal | Journal of Physics A: Mathematical and General |
Volume | 34 |
Issue number | 41 |
DOIs | |
State | Published - Oct 19 2001 |
ASJC Scopus subject areas
- Statistical and Nonlinear Physics
- Mathematical Physics
- Physics and Astronomy(all)