Epistemological contextualism and the problem of moral luck

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9 Scopus citations

Abstract

We have a strong intuition that a person's moral standing should not be affected by luck, but the fact is that we do blame a morally unfortunate person more than her fortunate counterpart. This is the problem of moral luck. I argue that the problem arises because account is not taken of the fact that the extension of the term 'blame' is contextually determined. Loosely speaking, the more likely an act is to have an undesirable consequence, the more its agent is to blame. But how likely a consequence is depends on which possibilities of harm we take to be relevant.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Pages (from-to)351-370
Number of pages20
JournalPacific Philosophical Quarterly
Volume84
Issue number4
DOIs
StatePublished - Jan 1 2003
Externally publishedYes

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Philosophy

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