Efficiency and formalism of quantum games

Chiu Fan Lee, Neil F Johnson

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

1 Citation (Scopus)

Abstract

We show that quantum games are more efficient than classical games and provide a saturated upper bound for this efficiency. We also demonstrate that the set of finite classical games is a strict subset of the set of finite quantum games. Our analysis is based on a rigorous formulation of quantum games, from which quantum versions of the minimax theorem and the Nash equilibrium theorem can be deduced.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Number of pages1
JournalPhysical Review A - Atomic, Molecular, and Optical Physics
Volume67
Issue number2
DOIs
StatePublished - Jan 1 2003
Externally publishedYes

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games
formalism
theorems
set theory
formulations

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Atomic and Molecular Physics, and Optics

Cite this

Efficiency and formalism of quantum games. / Lee, Chiu Fan; Johnson, Neil F.

In: Physical Review A - Atomic, Molecular, and Optical Physics, Vol. 67, No. 2, 01.01.2003.

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

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