Earnings management and investor protection: An international comparison

Christian Leuz, Dhananjay Nanda, Peter D. Wysocki

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingChapter

1 Scopus citations

Abstract

This paper examines systematic differences in earnings management across 31 countries.We propose an explanation for these differences based on the notion that insiders, in an attempt to protect their private control benefits, use earnings management to conceal firm performance from outsiders. Thus, earnings management is expected to decrease in investor protection because strong protection limits insiders' ability to acquire private control benefits, which reduces their incentives to mask firm performance. Our findings are consistent with this prediction and suggest an endogenous link between corporate governance and the quality of reported earnings.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Title of host publicationCorporate Governance and Corporate Finance
Subtitle of host publicationA European Perspective
PublisherRoutledge
Pages623-643
Number of pages21
ISBN (Print)020394013X, 9780203940136
DOIs
StatePublished - Dec 19 2007

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Economics, Econometrics and Finance(all)
  • Business, Management and Accounting(all)

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    Leuz, C., Nanda, D., & Wysocki, P. D. (2007). Earnings management and investor protection: An international comparison. In Corporate Governance and Corporate Finance: A European Perspective (pp. 623-643). Routledge. https://doi.org/10.4324/9780203940136