Abstract
We examine changes in CEOs' disclosure styles in quarterly earnings conference calls over their tenure. Our longitudinal analysis of newly hired CEOs shows that CEOs' forward-looking disclosures and their disclosures' relative optimism decline in their tenure. Further, externally hired and inexperienced CEOs are more future-oriented, and younger CEOs exhibit greater optimism in their disclosures. We also find that non-CEO executives' disclosure styles remain time-invariant over their CEOs' tenure. Our evidence is consistent with uncertainty reduction about managers' ability over their tenure (1) reducing the demand for and the supply of forward-looking disclosures, and (2) attenuating managerial career concerns leading to the decline in disclosure optimism.
Original language | English (US) |
---|---|
Pages (from-to) | 103-140 |
Number of pages | 38 |
Journal | Accounting Review |
Volume | 94 |
Issue number | 4 |
DOIs | |
State | Published - Jan 1 2019 |
Keywords
- Ability uncertainty
- Career concerns
- CEO tenure
- Disclosure tone
- Earnings conference calls
- Forward-looking information
- Voluntary disclosure
ASJC Scopus subject areas
- Accounting
- Finance
- Economics and Econometrics