Dynamic service selection games in heterogeneous small cell networks with multiple providers

Luca Rose, E. Veronica Belmega, Walid Saad, Merouane Debbah

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingConference contribution

5 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

The strategic deployment of small cells, overlaid on existing wireless infrastructure is foreseen as a key technologies enabling wireless operators to offer a plethora of innovative technologies to their customers. This, in turn, introduces novel technical challenges arising from the selfish behavior of the customers who ultimately seek to select their preferred wireless service while optimizing the quality-price trade-off of this choice. Consequently, wireless providers have to select the optimal pricing policies which maximize their revenues while anticipating the customers' behavior. In this paper, we provide a game-theoretic model suitable for modeling and analyzing the complex interactions between providers and customers in heterogeneous wireless networks. The proposed game is based on a hybrid model that combines a Stackelberg formulation in which the service provider acts as a leader and the customers, acting as followers, engage in a non-cooperative Wardrop game. For the customers' game, we show the existence and give the analytic expression of the Wardrop equilibria irrespective of the number of providers, services offered and quality of services functions. Then, we propose and study different best response based dynamics at the customers' level. We show that these dynamics converge to the equilibrium if only a portion of the customers are allowed to change strategy at each instant. For characterizing the equilibrium of the Stackelberg game, we propose a novel distributed algorithm that can be adopted by the providers and customers in a practical network. Numerical results show that providers are able to reasonably predict the customers' behavior by evaluating the outcome of the so called Krasnoselskij algorithm, and, subsequently optimize their price.

Original languageEnglish
Title of host publicationProceedings of the International Symposium on Wireless Communication Systems
Pages1078-1082
Number of pages5
DOIs
StatePublished - Dec 24 2012
Event2012 9th International Symposium on Wireless Communication Systems, ISWCS 2012 - Paris, France
Duration: Aug 28 2012Aug 31 2012

Other

Other2012 9th International Symposium on Wireless Communication Systems, ISWCS 2012
CountryFrance
CityParis
Period8/28/128/31/12

Fingerprint

customer
Heterogeneous networks
Parallel algorithms
Wireless networks
Quality of service
service provider
key technology
Costs
follower
pricing
revenue
leader
infrastructure
interaction

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Computer Networks and Communications
  • Electrical and Electronic Engineering
  • Communication

Cite this

Rose, L., Belmega, E. V., Saad, W., & Debbah, M. (2012). Dynamic service selection games in heterogeneous small cell networks with multiple providers. In Proceedings of the International Symposium on Wireless Communication Systems (pp. 1078-1082). [6328534] https://doi.org/10.1109/ISWCS.2012.6328534

Dynamic service selection games in heterogeneous small cell networks with multiple providers. / Rose, Luca; Belmega, E. Veronica; Saad, Walid; Debbah, Merouane.

Proceedings of the International Symposium on Wireless Communication Systems. 2012. p. 1078-1082 6328534.

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingConference contribution

Rose, L, Belmega, EV, Saad, W & Debbah, M 2012, Dynamic service selection games in heterogeneous small cell networks with multiple providers. in Proceedings of the International Symposium on Wireless Communication Systems., 6328534, pp. 1078-1082, 2012 9th International Symposium on Wireless Communication Systems, ISWCS 2012, Paris, France, 8/28/12. https://doi.org/10.1109/ISWCS.2012.6328534
Rose L, Belmega EV, Saad W, Debbah M. Dynamic service selection games in heterogeneous small cell networks with multiple providers. In Proceedings of the International Symposium on Wireless Communication Systems. 2012. p. 1078-1082. 6328534 https://doi.org/10.1109/ISWCS.2012.6328534
Rose, Luca ; Belmega, E. Veronica ; Saad, Walid ; Debbah, Merouane. / Dynamic service selection games in heterogeneous small cell networks with multiple providers. Proceedings of the International Symposium on Wireless Communication Systems. 2012. pp. 1078-1082
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