TY - JOUR
T1 - Do managers withhold bad news
AU - Kothari, S. P.
AU - Shu, Susan
AU - Wysocki, Peter D.
PY - 2009/3/1
Y1 - 2009/3/1
N2 - In this study, we examine whether managers delay disclosure of bad news relative to good news. If managers accumulate and withhold bad news up to a certain threshold, but leak and immediately reveal good news to investors, then we expect the magnitude of the negative stock price reaction to bad news disclosures to be greater than the magnitude of the positive stock price reaction to good news disclosures. We present evidence consistent with this prediction. Our analysis suggests that management, on average, delays the release of bad news to investors. Copyright;
AB - In this study, we examine whether managers delay disclosure of bad news relative to good news. If managers accumulate and withhold bad news up to a certain threshold, but leak and immediately reveal good news to investors, then we expect the magnitude of the negative stock price reaction to bad news disclosures to be greater than the magnitude of the positive stock price reaction to good news disclosures. We present evidence consistent with this prediction. Our analysis suggests that management, on average, delays the release of bad news to investors. Copyright;
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U2 - 10.1111/j.1475-679X.2008.00318.x
DO - 10.1111/j.1475-679X.2008.00318.x
M3 - Article
AN - SCOPUS:58449124136
VL - 47
SP - 241
EP - 276
JO - Journal of Accounting Research
JF - Journal of Accounting Research
SN - 0021-8456
IS - 1
ER -