Abstract
In this study, we examine whether managers delay disclosure of bad news relative to good news. If managers accumulate and withhold bad news up to a certain threshold, but leak and immediately reveal good news to investors, then we expect the magnitude of the negative stock price reaction to bad news disclosures to be greater than the magnitude of the positive stock price reaction to good news disclosures. We present evidence consistent with this prediction. Our analysis suggests that management, on average, delays the release of bad news to investors. Copyright;
| Original language | English (US) |
|---|---|
| Pages (from-to) | 241-276 |
| Number of pages | 36 |
| Journal | Journal of Accounting Research |
| Volume | 47 |
| Issue number | 1 |
| DOIs | |
| State | Published - Mar 1 2009 |
ASJC Scopus subject areas
- Accounting
- Finance
- Economics and Econometrics
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Cite this
Kothari, S. P., Shu, S., & Wysocki, P. D. (2009). Do managers withhold bad news. Journal of Accounting Research, 47(1), 241-276. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1475-679X.2008.00318.x