Abstract
In this study, we examine whether managers delay disclosure of bad news relative to good news. If managers accumulate and withhold bad news up to a certain threshold, but leak and immediately reveal good news to investors, then we expect the magnitude of the negative stock price reaction to bad news disclosures to be greater than the magnitude of the positive stock price reaction to good news disclosures. We present evidence consistent with this prediction. Our analysis suggests that management, on average, delays the release of bad news to investors. Copyright;
| Original language | English (US) |
|---|---|
| Pages (from-to) | 241-276 |
| Number of pages | 36 |
| Journal | Journal of Accounting Research |
| Volume | 47 |
| Issue number | 1 |
| DOIs | |
| State | Published - Mar 2009 |
| Externally published | Yes |
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ASJC Scopus subject areas
- Finance
- Accounting
- Economics and Econometrics
Cite this
Do managers withhold bad news. / Kothari, S. P.; Shu, Susan; Wysocki, Peter.
In: Journal of Accounting Research, Vol. 47, No. 1, 03.2009, p. 241-276.Research output: Contribution to journal › Article
}
TY - JOUR
T1 - Do managers withhold bad news
AU - Kothari, S. P.
AU - Shu, Susan
AU - Wysocki, Peter
PY - 2009/3
Y1 - 2009/3
N2 - In this study, we examine whether managers delay disclosure of bad news relative to good news. If managers accumulate and withhold bad news up to a certain threshold, but leak and immediately reveal good news to investors, then we expect the magnitude of the negative stock price reaction to bad news disclosures to be greater than the magnitude of the positive stock price reaction to good news disclosures. We present evidence consistent with this prediction. Our analysis suggests that management, on average, delays the release of bad news to investors. Copyright;
AB - In this study, we examine whether managers delay disclosure of bad news relative to good news. If managers accumulate and withhold bad news up to a certain threshold, but leak and immediately reveal good news to investors, then we expect the magnitude of the negative stock price reaction to bad news disclosures to be greater than the magnitude of the positive stock price reaction to good news disclosures. We present evidence consistent with this prediction. Our analysis suggests that management, on average, delays the release of bad news to investors. Copyright;
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=58449124136&partnerID=8YFLogxK
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/citedby.url?scp=58449124136&partnerID=8YFLogxK
U2 - 10.1111/j.1475-679X.2008.00318.x
DO - 10.1111/j.1475-679X.2008.00318.x
M3 - Article
AN - SCOPUS:58449124136
VL - 47
SP - 241
EP - 276
JO - Journal of Accounting Research
JF - Journal of Accounting Research
SN - 0021-8456
IS - 1
ER -