Do Firms Time Equity Offerings? Evidence from the 1930s and 1940s

Timothy Burch, William G. Christie, Vikram Nanda

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

25 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

We investigate whether the timing of equity sales to exploit market overvaluation may account for the reported poor post-offer stock performance of firms issuing equity. We posit that rights offers, targeted to a firm's current shareholders, are less likely to be timed to exploit overvaluation. Our study compares firm commitment and rights offerings during 1933-1949 when rights offers were common. We find that abnormal returns for firms electing the firm commitment method were significantly negative over the year following the offer, while those for firms using rights were not. This suggests that firm commitments were timed, while rights offers were not.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Pages (from-to)5-23
Number of pages19
JournalFinancial Management
Volume33
Issue number1
StatePublished - Mar 1 2004

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Equity offerings
Overvaluation
Equity
Rights offerings
Stock performance
Shareholders
Abnormal returns

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Accounting
  • Finance
  • Economics and Econometrics

Cite this

Do Firms Time Equity Offerings? Evidence from the 1930s and 1940s. / Burch, Timothy; Christie, William G.; Nanda, Vikram.

In: Financial Management, Vol. 33, No. 1, 01.03.2004, p. 5-23.

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

Burch, T, Christie, WG & Nanda, V 2004, 'Do Firms Time Equity Offerings? Evidence from the 1930s and 1940s', Financial Management, vol. 33, no. 1, pp. 5-23.
Burch, Timothy ; Christie, William G. ; Nanda, Vikram. / Do Firms Time Equity Offerings? Evidence from the 1930s and 1940s. In: Financial Management. 2004 ; Vol. 33, No. 1. pp. 5-23.
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