Disobedient Markets: Street Vendors, Enforcement, and State Intervention in Collective Action

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

11 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

At 50% of the global workforce, informal workers constitute a large, diffuse, and resource-poor group with high barriers to collective action. Contrary to scholars’ expectations, informal workers organize to varying degrees in most countries, and states often encourage them to do so. Why do some informal workers organize while others do not? I argue that states can intervene in informal workers’ collective action decisions: As enforcement costs increase, states may pay informal workers to organize, and then bargain with the resulting organization over self-regulation. I present a game theoretic model of state intervention in collective action and illustrate it with original ethnographic, survey, and interview evidence from street markets in La Paz, Bolivia. I suggest that informal workers interact strategically with states and conclude with implications for formalization policies.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Pages (from-to)1524-1555
Number of pages32
JournalComparative Political Studies
Volume50
Issue number11
DOIs
StatePublished - Sep 1 2017
Externally publishedYes

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collective behavior
worker
market
formalization
Bolivia
self-regulation
organization
costs
interview
resources
evidence
Group

Keywords

  • collective action
  • formal theory
  • Latin American politics
  • politics of growth/development
  • qualitative methods
  • social movements

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Sociology and Political Science

Cite this

Disobedient Markets : Street Vendors, Enforcement, and State Intervention in Collective Action. / Hummel, Calla.

In: Comparative Political Studies, Vol. 50, No. 11, 01.09.2017, p. 1524-1555.

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

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