Abstract
At 50% of the global workforce, informal workers constitute a large, diffuse, and resource-poor group with high barriers to collective action. Contrary to scholars’ expectations, informal workers organize to varying degrees in most countries, and states often encourage them to do so. Why do some informal workers organize while others do not? I argue that states can intervene in informal workers’ collective action decisions: As enforcement costs increase, states may pay informal workers to organize, and then bargain with the resulting organization over self-regulation. I present a game theoretic model of state intervention in collective action and illustrate it with original ethnographic, survey, and interview evidence from street markets in La Paz, Bolivia. I suggest that informal workers interact strategically with states and conclude with implications for formalization policies.
| Original language | English (US) |
|---|---|
| Pages (from-to) | 1524-1555 |
| Number of pages | 32 |
| Journal | Comparative Political Studies |
| Volume | 50 |
| Issue number | 11 |
| DOIs | |
| State | Published - Sep 1 2017 |
| Externally published | Yes |
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Keywords
- collective action
- formal theory
- Latin American politics
- politics of growth/development
- qualitative methods
- social movements
ASJC Scopus subject areas
- Sociology and Political Science
Cite this
Disobedient Markets : Street Vendors, Enforcement, and State Intervention in Collective Action. / Hummel, Calla.
In: Comparative Political Studies, Vol. 50, No. 11, 01.09.2017, p. 1524-1555.Research output: Contribution to journal › Article
}
TY - JOUR
T1 - Disobedient Markets
T2 - Street Vendors, Enforcement, and State Intervention in Collective Action
AU - Hummel, Calla
PY - 2017/9/1
Y1 - 2017/9/1
N2 - At 50% of the global workforce, informal workers constitute a large, diffuse, and resource-poor group with high barriers to collective action. Contrary to scholars’ expectations, informal workers organize to varying degrees in most countries, and states often encourage them to do so. Why do some informal workers organize while others do not? I argue that states can intervene in informal workers’ collective action decisions: As enforcement costs increase, states may pay informal workers to organize, and then bargain with the resulting organization over self-regulation. I present a game theoretic model of state intervention in collective action and illustrate it with original ethnographic, survey, and interview evidence from street markets in La Paz, Bolivia. I suggest that informal workers interact strategically with states and conclude with implications for formalization policies.
AB - At 50% of the global workforce, informal workers constitute a large, diffuse, and resource-poor group with high barriers to collective action. Contrary to scholars’ expectations, informal workers organize to varying degrees in most countries, and states often encourage them to do so. Why do some informal workers organize while others do not? I argue that states can intervene in informal workers’ collective action decisions: As enforcement costs increase, states may pay informal workers to organize, and then bargain with the resulting organization over self-regulation. I present a game theoretic model of state intervention in collective action and illustrate it with original ethnographic, survey, and interview evidence from street markets in La Paz, Bolivia. I suggest that informal workers interact strategically with states and conclude with implications for formalization policies.
KW - collective action
KW - formal theory
KW - Latin American politics
KW - politics of growth/development
KW - qualitative methods
KW - social movements
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=85026876380&partnerID=8YFLogxK
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/citedby.url?scp=85026876380&partnerID=8YFLogxK
U2 - 10.1177/0010414016679177
DO - 10.1177/0010414016679177
M3 - Article
AN - SCOPUS:85026876380
VL - 50
SP - 1524
EP - 1555
JO - Comparative Political Studies
JF - Comparative Political Studies
SN - 0010-4140
IS - 11
ER -