Abstract
Computation offloading via device-to-device (D2D) communication, or D2D offloading, can enhance mobile computing performance by exploiting spare computing resources of nearby user devices. The success of D2D offloading relies on user participation in collaborative service provisioning, which incurs extra costs to users providing the service, thus mandating an incentive mechanism that can compensate for these costs. Although incentive mechanism design has been intensively studied in the literature, this paper considers a much more challenging yet less investigated problem in which selfish users are also facing interdependent security risks, such as infectious proximity-based attacks. Security cost is significantly different in nature from conventional service provisioning costs such as energy consumption because security risks often depend on the collective behavior of all users. To this end, we build a novel mathematical framework by leveraging the combined power of game theory and epidemic theory to investigate the interplay between user incentives and interdependent security risks in D2D offloading, thereby enabling the design of security-aware incentive mechanisms. Our analysis discovers an interesting “less is more” phenomenon: although giving users more incentives promotes more participation, it may harm the network operator’s utility. This is because too much participation may foster persistent security risks and as a result, the effective participation level does not improve.
| Original language | English (US) |
|---|---|
| Journal | IEEE Transactions on Wireless Communications |
| DOIs | |
| State | Accepted/In press - Jul 17 2018 |
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Keywords
- computation offloading
- Computational modeling
- Device-to-device
- Device-to-device communication
- epidemic models
- game theory
- incentives
- Mobile handsets
- Security
- security
- Servers
- Wireless networks
ASJC Scopus subject areas
- Computer Science Applications
- Electrical and Electronic Engineering
- Applied Mathematics
Cite this
Designing Security-Aware Incentives for Computation Offloading via Device-to-Device Communication. / Xu, Jie; Chen, Lixing; Liu, Kun; Shen, Cong.
In: IEEE Transactions on Wireless Communications, 17.07.2018.Research output: Contribution to journal › Article
}
TY - JOUR
T1 - Designing Security-Aware Incentives for Computation Offloading via Device-to-Device Communication
AU - Xu, Jie
AU - Chen, Lixing
AU - Liu, Kun
AU - Shen, Cong
PY - 2018/7/17
Y1 - 2018/7/17
N2 - Computation offloading via device-to-device (D2D) communication, or D2D offloading, can enhance mobile computing performance by exploiting spare computing resources of nearby user devices. The success of D2D offloading relies on user participation in collaborative service provisioning, which incurs extra costs to users providing the service, thus mandating an incentive mechanism that can compensate for these costs. Although incentive mechanism design has been intensively studied in the literature, this paper considers a much more challenging yet less investigated problem in which selfish users are also facing interdependent security risks, such as infectious proximity-based attacks. Security cost is significantly different in nature from conventional service provisioning costs such as energy consumption because security risks often depend on the collective behavior of all users. To this end, we build a novel mathematical framework by leveraging the combined power of game theory and epidemic theory to investigate the interplay between user incentives and interdependent security risks in D2D offloading, thereby enabling the design of security-aware incentive mechanisms. Our analysis discovers an interesting “less is more” phenomenon: although giving users more incentives promotes more participation, it may harm the network operator’s utility. This is because too much participation may foster persistent security risks and as a result, the effective participation level does not improve.
AB - Computation offloading via device-to-device (D2D) communication, or D2D offloading, can enhance mobile computing performance by exploiting spare computing resources of nearby user devices. The success of D2D offloading relies on user participation in collaborative service provisioning, which incurs extra costs to users providing the service, thus mandating an incentive mechanism that can compensate for these costs. Although incentive mechanism design has been intensively studied in the literature, this paper considers a much more challenging yet less investigated problem in which selfish users are also facing interdependent security risks, such as infectious proximity-based attacks. Security cost is significantly different in nature from conventional service provisioning costs such as energy consumption because security risks often depend on the collective behavior of all users. To this end, we build a novel mathematical framework by leveraging the combined power of game theory and epidemic theory to investigate the interplay between user incentives and interdependent security risks in D2D offloading, thereby enabling the design of security-aware incentive mechanisms. Our analysis discovers an interesting “less is more” phenomenon: although giving users more incentives promotes more participation, it may harm the network operator’s utility. This is because too much participation may foster persistent security risks and as a result, the effective participation level does not improve.
KW - computation offloading
KW - Computational modeling
KW - Device-to-device
KW - Device-to-device communication
KW - epidemic models
KW - game theory
KW - incentives
KW - Mobile handsets
KW - Security
KW - security
KW - Servers
KW - Wireless networks
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=85050212937&partnerID=8YFLogxK
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/citedby.url?scp=85050212937&partnerID=8YFLogxK
U2 - 10.1109/TWC.2018.2854579
DO - 10.1109/TWC.2018.2854579
M3 - Article
JO - IEEE Transactions on Wireless Communications
JF - IEEE Transactions on Wireless Communications
SN - 1536-1276
ER -