TY - JOUR
T1 - Designing security-aware incentives for computation offloading via device-to-device communication
AU - Xu, Jie
AU - Chen, Lixing
AU - Liu, Kun
AU - Shen, Cong
N1 - Funding Information:
Manuscript received September 21, 2017; revised January 25, 2018 and April 29, 2018; accepted June 19, 2018. Date of publication July 17, 2018; date of current version September 10, 2018. The work of J. Xu and L. Chen was supported by the U.S. Army Research Office under Grant W911NF1810343. The work of K. Liu and C. Shen was supported by the National Natural Science Foundation of China under Grant 61631017. The associate editor coordinating the review of this paper and approving it for publication was L. Song. (Corresponding author: Cong Shen.) J. Xu and L. Chen are with the Electrical and Computer Engineering Department, University of Miami, Coral Gables, FL 33146 USA (e-mail: jiexu@miami.edu; lx.chen@miami.edu).
PY - 2018/9
Y1 - 2018/9
N2 - Computation offloading via device-to-device (D2D) communication, or D2D offloading, can enhance mobile computing performance by exploiting spare computing resources of nearby user devices. The success of D2D offloading relies on user participation in collaborative service provisioning, which incurs extra costs to users providing the service, thus mandating an incentive mechanism that can compensate for these costs. Although incentive mechanism design has been intensively studied in the literature, this paper considers a much more challenging yet less investigated problem in which selfish users are also facing interdependent security risks, such as infectious proximity-based attacks. Security cost is significantly different in nature from conventional service provisioning costs such as energy consumption because security risks often depend on the collective behavior of all users. To this end, we build a novel mathematical framework by leveraging the combined power of game theory and epidemic theory to investigate the interplay between user incentives and interdependent security risks in D2D offloading, thereby enabling the design of security-aware incentive mechanisms. Our analysis discovers an interesting 'less is more' phenomenon: although giving users more incentives promotes more participation, it may harm the network operator's utility. This is because too much participation may foster persistent security risks, and as a result, the effective participation level does not improve.
AB - Computation offloading via device-to-device (D2D) communication, or D2D offloading, can enhance mobile computing performance by exploiting spare computing resources of nearby user devices. The success of D2D offloading relies on user participation in collaborative service provisioning, which incurs extra costs to users providing the service, thus mandating an incentive mechanism that can compensate for these costs. Although incentive mechanism design has been intensively studied in the literature, this paper considers a much more challenging yet less investigated problem in which selfish users are also facing interdependent security risks, such as infectious proximity-based attacks. Security cost is significantly different in nature from conventional service provisioning costs such as energy consumption because security risks often depend on the collective behavior of all users. To this end, we build a novel mathematical framework by leveraging the combined power of game theory and epidemic theory to investigate the interplay between user incentives and interdependent security risks in D2D offloading, thereby enabling the design of security-aware incentive mechanisms. Our analysis discovers an interesting 'less is more' phenomenon: although giving users more incentives promotes more participation, it may harm the network operator's utility. This is because too much participation may foster persistent security risks, and as a result, the effective participation level does not improve.
KW - Device-to-device
KW - computation offloading
KW - epidemic models
KW - game theory
KW - incentives
KW - security
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U2 - 10.1109/TWC.2018.2854579
DO - 10.1109/TWC.2018.2854579
M3 - Article
AN - SCOPUS:85050212937
VL - 17
SP - 6053
EP - 6066
JO - IEEE Transactions on Wireless Communications
JF - IEEE Transactions on Wireless Communications
SN - 1536-1276
IS - 9
M1 - 8412253
ER -