TY - GEN

T1 - Designing incentives for wireless relay networks using tokens

AU - Xu, Jie

AU - Van Der Schaar, Mihaela

PY - 2012/10/5

Y1 - 2012/10/5

N2 - This paper proposes a novel system design for wireless relay networks formed of self-interested users that relies on token exchanges. Our emphasis in this paper is on developing optimal designs for token systems to be deployed in relay networks. The optimal designs aim to maximize the probability that the relay transmission will be executed by transceivers whenever they are requested to provide such services. We prove that the efficiency of the relay network heavily depends on issuing the optimal amount of tokens rather than an arbitrary amount. We formulate the design problem of the token system as a bi-level optimization problem. In the inner level optimization problem, we determine the transceivers' incentive-compatible strategies (i.e. the strategies that maximize the transceivers' own utilities). We prove that these strategies exhibit a simple threshold structure. The outer level problem determines the optimal token amount, which maximizes the overall relay network efficiency. We prove that the optimal amount of tokens tokens needs to be neither too small nor too large and depends on the threshold that the self-interested transceivers adopt in the inner level problem.

AB - This paper proposes a novel system design for wireless relay networks formed of self-interested users that relies on token exchanges. Our emphasis in this paper is on developing optimal designs for token systems to be deployed in relay networks. The optimal designs aim to maximize the probability that the relay transmission will be executed by transceivers whenever they are requested to provide such services. We prove that the efficiency of the relay network heavily depends on issuing the optimal amount of tokens rather than an arbitrary amount. We formulate the design problem of the token system as a bi-level optimization problem. In the inner level optimization problem, we determine the transceivers' incentive-compatible strategies (i.e. the strategies that maximize the transceivers' own utilities). We prove that these strategies exhibit a simple threshold structure. The outer level problem determines the optimal token amount, which maximizes the overall relay network efficiency. We prove that the optimal amount of tokens tokens needs to be neither too small nor too large and depends on the threshold that the self-interested transceivers adopt in the inner level problem.

UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=84866919891&partnerID=8YFLogxK

UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/citedby.url?scp=84866919891&partnerID=8YFLogxK

M3 - Conference contribution

AN - SCOPUS:84866919891

SN - 9783901882456

T3 - 2012 10th International Symposium on Modeling and Optimization in Mobile, Ad Hoc and Wireless Networks, WiOpt 2012

SP - 169

EP - 176

BT - 2012 10th International Symposium on Modeling and Optimization in Mobile, Ad Hoc and Wireless Networks, WiOpt 2012

T2 - 2012 10th International Symposium on Modeling and Optimization in Mobile, Ad Hoc and Wireless Networks, WiOpt 2012

Y2 - 14 May 2012 through 18 May 2012

ER -