Descriptions: Predicates or quantifiers?

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

4 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

In this paper I revisit the main arguments for a predicate analysis of descriptions in order to determine whether they do in fact undermine Russell's theory. I argue that while the arguments without doubt provide powerful evidence against Russell's original theory, it is far from clear that they tell against a quantificational account of descriptions.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Pages (from-to)117-136
Number of pages20
JournalAustralasian Journal of Philosophy
Volume85
Issue number1
DOIs
StatePublished - 2007
Externally publishedYes

Fingerprint

Quantifiers

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Philosophy

Cite this

Descriptions : Predicates or quantifiers? / Brogaard, Berit.

In: Australasian Journal of Philosophy, Vol. 85, No. 1, 2007, p. 117-136.

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

@article{e6f3b0fed3fa4039ad29eb1e8c7183b9,
title = "Descriptions: Predicates or quantifiers?",
abstract = "In this paper I revisit the main arguments for a predicate analysis of descriptions in order to determine whether they do in fact undermine Russell's theory. I argue that while the arguments without doubt provide powerful evidence against Russell's original theory, it is far from clear that they tell against a quantificational account of descriptions.",
author = "Berit Brogaard",
year = "2007",
doi = "10.1080/00048400601185495",
language = "English (US)",
volume = "85",
pages = "117--136",
journal = "Australasian Journal of Philosophy",
issn = "0004-8402",
publisher = "Taylor and Francis Ltd.",
number = "1",

}

TY - JOUR

T1 - Descriptions

T2 - Predicates or quantifiers?

AU - Brogaard, Berit

PY - 2007

Y1 - 2007

N2 - In this paper I revisit the main arguments for a predicate analysis of descriptions in order to determine whether they do in fact undermine Russell's theory. I argue that while the arguments without doubt provide powerful evidence against Russell's original theory, it is far from clear that they tell against a quantificational account of descriptions.

AB - In this paper I revisit the main arguments for a predicate analysis of descriptions in order to determine whether they do in fact undermine Russell's theory. I argue that while the arguments without doubt provide powerful evidence against Russell's original theory, it is far from clear that they tell against a quantificational account of descriptions.

UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=34547862495&partnerID=8YFLogxK

UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/citedby.url?scp=34547862495&partnerID=8YFLogxK

U2 - 10.1080/00048400601185495

DO - 10.1080/00048400601185495

M3 - Article

AN - SCOPUS:34547862495

VL - 85

SP - 117

EP - 136

JO - Australasian Journal of Philosophy

JF - Australasian Journal of Philosophy

SN - 0004-8402

IS - 1

ER -