Death and dignity: Terminal illness and the market for non-treatment

Margaret M Byrne, Peter Thompson

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

8 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

We construct a stochastic model of illness, death and treatment choice to analyze two proposals - legally-binding advance directives and insurer-paid compensation schemes - to reduce the incidence of aggressive and possibly futile end-of-life treatment. We assess whether, in a competitive insurance market, the proposals are consistent with (i) individual rationality in selection of competitive insurance contracts; (ii) medically ethical treatment provision; and (iii) reductions in end-of-life expenditures. We conclude that binding advance directives are always medically unethical, while compensation schemes are medically ethical. We derive the compensation schedule arising in a competitive equilibrium, and show that it reduces aggressive treatment and satisfies individual rationality.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)263-294
Number of pages32
JournalJournal of Public Economics
Volume76
Issue number2
StatePublished - May 1 2000
Externally publishedYes

Fingerprint

Dignity
Illness
Individual rationality
Advance directives
End of life
Insurance market
Insurer
Schedule
Stochastic model
Insurance contract
Expenditure
Competitive equilibrium

Keywords

  • Health care
  • Health expenditures
  • Health insurance
  • I3
  • Quality of life
  • Terminal illness

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Economics and Econometrics
  • Finance

Cite this

Death and dignity : Terminal illness and the market for non-treatment. / Byrne, Margaret M; Thompson, Peter.

In: Journal of Public Economics, Vol. 76, No. 2, 01.05.2000, p. 263-294.

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

Byrne, MM & Thompson, P 2000, 'Death and dignity: Terminal illness and the market for non-treatment', Journal of Public Economics, vol. 76, no. 2, pp. 263-294.
Byrne, Margaret M ; Thompson, Peter. / Death and dignity : Terminal illness and the market for non-treatment. In: Journal of Public Economics. 2000 ; Vol. 76, No. 2. pp. 263-294.
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