Cooperative behavior in evolutionary snowdrift game with bounded rationality

Y. C. Ni, C. Xu, P. M. Hui, Neil F Johnson

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

10 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

An evolutionary snowdrift game (SG) that incorporates bounded rationality and limited information in the evolutionary process is proposed and studied. Based on SG in a well-mixed population and defining the winning action at a turn to be the one that gets a higher payoff, the most recent m winning actions can be used as a public information based on which the competing agents decide their next actions. This defines a strategy pool from which each agent picks a number of strategies as their tool in adapting to the competing environment. The payoff parameter r in SG serves to set the maximum number of winners per turn. Due to the bounded rationality and limited information, the cooperative frequency shows steps and plateaux as a function of r and these features tend to be smoothed out as m increases. These features are results of an interplay between a restricted subset of m-bit histories that the system can visit at a value of r and the limited capacity that agents can adapt. The standard deviation in the number of agents taking the cooperative action is also studied. For general values of r, our model generates a realization of the binary-agent-resource model. The idea of introducing bounded rationality into a two-person game to realize the minority game or binary-agent-resource model could be a useful tool for future research.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Pages (from-to)4856-4862
Number of pages7
JournalPhysica A: Statistical Mechanics and its Applications
Volume388
Issue number23
DOIs
StatePublished - Dec 1 2009

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Bounded Rationality
Cooperative Behavior
Evolutionary Game
games
resources
Game
Binary
Minority Game
Two-person Games
Resources
minorities
Standard deviation
set theory
standard deviation
plateaus
histories
Model
Tend
Subset

Keywords

  • Bounded rationality
  • Minority game
  • Snowdrift game

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Condensed Matter Physics
  • Statistics and Probability

Cite this

Cooperative behavior in evolutionary snowdrift game with bounded rationality. / Ni, Y. C.; Xu, C.; Hui, P. M.; Johnson, Neil F.

In: Physica A: Statistical Mechanics and its Applications, Vol. 388, No. 23, 01.12.2009, p. 4856-4862.

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

Ni, Y. C. ; Xu, C. ; Hui, P. M. ; Johnson, Neil F. / Cooperative behavior in evolutionary snowdrift game with bounded rationality. In: Physica A: Statistical Mechanics and its Applications. 2009 ; Vol. 388, No. 23. pp. 4856-4862.
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