Contractarianismand animal rights

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

32 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

It is widely accepted, by both friends and foes of animal rights, that contractarianism is the moral theory least likely to justify the assigning of direct moral status to non-human animals. These are not, it is generally supposed, rational agents, and contractarian approaches can grant direct moral status only to such agents. I shall argue that this widely accepted view is false. At least some forms of contractarianism, when properly understood, do, in fact, entail that non-human animals possess direct moral status, independently of their utility for rational agents, and independently of whatever interests rational agents may have in them. The version of contractarianism I shall focus upon is that defended by John Rawls.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Pages (from-to)235-247
Number of pages13
JournalJournal of Applied Philosophy
Volume14
Issue number3
DOIs
StatePublished - Nov 1 1997
Externally publishedYes

Fingerprint

Animal Rights
Contractarianism
Moral Status
Nonhuman Animals
Moral Theory
John Rawls

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Philosophy

Cite this

Contractarianismand animal rights. / Rowlands, Mark.

In: Journal of Applied Philosophy, Vol. 14, No. 3, 01.11.1997, p. 235-247.

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

@article{eedebc5c943b42f9909065ecab2cd779,
title = "Contractarianismand animal rights",
abstract = "It is widely accepted, by both friends and foes of animal rights, that contractarianism is the moral theory least likely to justify the assigning of direct moral status to non-human animals. These are not, it is generally supposed, rational agents, and contractarian approaches can grant direct moral status only to such agents. I shall argue that this widely accepted view is false. At least some forms of contractarianism, when properly understood, do, in fact, entail that non-human animals possess direct moral status, independently of their utility for rational agents, and independently of whatever interests rational agents may have in them. The version of contractarianism I shall focus upon is that defended by John Rawls.",
author = "Mark Rowlands",
year = "1997",
month = "11",
day = "1",
doi = "10.1111/1468-5930.00060",
language = "English (US)",
volume = "14",
pages = "235--247",
journal = "Journal of Applied Philosophy",
issn = "0264-3758",
publisher = "Carfax Publishing Ltd.",
number = "3",

}

TY - JOUR

T1 - Contractarianismand animal rights

AU - Rowlands, Mark

PY - 1997/11/1

Y1 - 1997/11/1

N2 - It is widely accepted, by both friends and foes of animal rights, that contractarianism is the moral theory least likely to justify the assigning of direct moral status to non-human animals. These are not, it is generally supposed, rational agents, and contractarian approaches can grant direct moral status only to such agents. I shall argue that this widely accepted view is false. At least some forms of contractarianism, when properly understood, do, in fact, entail that non-human animals possess direct moral status, independently of their utility for rational agents, and independently of whatever interests rational agents may have in them. The version of contractarianism I shall focus upon is that defended by John Rawls.

AB - It is widely accepted, by both friends and foes of animal rights, that contractarianism is the moral theory least likely to justify the assigning of direct moral status to non-human animals. These are not, it is generally supposed, rational agents, and contractarian approaches can grant direct moral status only to such agents. I shall argue that this widely accepted view is false. At least some forms of contractarianism, when properly understood, do, in fact, entail that non-human animals possess direct moral status, independently of their utility for rational agents, and independently of whatever interests rational agents may have in them. The version of contractarianism I shall focus upon is that defended by John Rawls.

UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=85015096142&partnerID=8YFLogxK

UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/citedby.url?scp=85015096142&partnerID=8YFLogxK

U2 - 10.1111/1468-5930.00060

DO - 10.1111/1468-5930.00060

M3 - Article

AN - SCOPUS:85015096142

VL - 14

SP - 235

EP - 247

JO - Journal of Applied Philosophy

JF - Journal of Applied Philosophy

SN - 0264-3758

IS - 3

ER -