Contract theory for incentive mechanism design in cooperative relaying networks

Yinshan Liu; Xiaofeng Zhong; Yang Yan; Jing Wang; Walid Saad

doi:10.1007/978-3-319-07782-6_28

Contract theory for incentive mechanism design in cooperative relaying networks

Yinshan Liu, Xiaofeng Zhong, Yang Yan, Jing Wang, Walid Saad

Electrical & Computer Engineering

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceeding › Conference contribution

Abstract

Multiuser cooperative communication significantly improves the performance of wireless communication networks. One key challenge of multiuser cooperative communication is how to design a cooperative mechanism to incentivize potential relay nodes to help a source node in its data transmission. In this paper, to address this problem, we apply a contract-based principal-agent framework to a cognitive-radio-based wireless relaying networks, in which a mobile relay node acts as the principal who designs Incentive Compatible (IC) and Individually Rational (IR) contract items, consisting of a set of rate-price pairs. Subsequently, contract items can be broadcast by a relay to nearby mobile users that want to send data. Once these sources optimally select a relay at the lowest cost and notify the contract items that they are willing to accept, the relay then chooses at least one source for which to provide service. Theoretical analysis and numerical results indicate that this pricing mechanism can lead to a win-win situation in which source nodes get good communication service and relay nodes maximize their own profit that can be used to purchase the relay service of other nodes when needed in the future.

Original language	English (US)
Title of host publication	Wireless Algorithms, Systems and Applications - 9th International Conference, WASA 2014, Proceedings
Editors	Zhipeng Cai, Chaokun Wang, Siyao Cheng, Hongzhi Wang, Hong Gao
Publisher	Springer Verlag
Pages	302-312
Number of pages	11
ISBN (Electronic)	9783319077819
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-07782-6_28
State	Published - 2014
Event	9th International Conference on Wireless Algorithms, Systems and Applications, WASA 2014 - Harbin, China Duration: Jun 23 2014 → Jun 25 2014

Publication series

Name	Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics)
Volume	8491
ISSN (Print)	0302-9743
ISSN (Electronic)	1611-3349

Other

Other	9th International Conference on Wireless Algorithms, Systems and Applications, WASA 2014
Country/Territory	China
City	Harbin
Period	6/23/14 → 6/25/14

Keywords

Contract theory
Cooperative communication
Incentive mechanism
Relaying networks

ASJC Scopus subject areas

Computer Science(all)
Theoretical Computer Science

Access to Document

10.1007/978-3-319-07782-6_28

Cite this

Liu, Y., Zhong, X., Yan, Y., Wang, J., & Saad, W. (2014). Contract theory for incentive mechanism design in cooperative relaying networks. In Z. Cai, C. Wang, S. Cheng, H. Wang, & H. Gao (Eds.), Wireless Algorithms, Systems and Applications - 9th International Conference, WASA 2014, Proceedings (pp. 302-312). (Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics); Vol. 8491). Springer Verlag. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-07782-6_28

Contract theory for incentive mechanism design in cooperative relaying networks. / Liu, Yinshan; Zhong, Xiaofeng; Yan, Yang; Wang, Jing; Saad, Walid.

Wireless Algorithms, Systems and Applications - 9th International Conference, WASA 2014, Proceedings. ed. / Zhipeng Cai; Chaokun Wang; Siyao Cheng; Hongzhi Wang; Hong Gao. Springer Verlag, 2014. p. 302-312 (Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics); Vol. 8491).

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceeding › Conference contribution

Liu, Y, Zhong, X, Yan, Y, Wang, J & Saad, W 2014, Contract theory for incentive mechanism design in cooperative relaying networks. in Z Cai, C Wang, S Cheng, H Wang & H Gao (eds), Wireless Algorithms, Systems and Applications - 9th International Conference, WASA 2014, Proceedings. Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics), vol. 8491, Springer Verlag, pp. 302-312, 9th International Conference on Wireless Algorithms, Systems and Applications, WASA 2014, Harbin, China, 6/23/14. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-07782-6_28

Liu Y, Zhong X, Yan Y, Wang J, Saad W. Contract theory for incentive mechanism design in cooperative relaying networks. In Cai Z, Wang C, Cheng S, Wang H, Gao H, editors, Wireless Algorithms, Systems and Applications - 9th International Conference, WASA 2014, Proceedings. Springer Verlag. 2014. p. 302-312. (Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics)). https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-07782-6_28

Liu, Yinshan ; Zhong, Xiaofeng ; Yan, Yang ; Wang, Jing ; Saad, Walid. / Contract theory for incentive mechanism design in cooperative relaying networks. Wireless Algorithms, Systems and Applications - 9th International Conference, WASA 2014, Proceedings. editor / Zhipeng Cai ; Chaokun Wang ; Siyao Cheng ; Hongzhi Wang ; Hong Gao. Springer Verlag, 2014. pp. 302-312 (Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics)).

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N2 - Multiuser cooperative communication significantly improves the performance of wireless communication networks. One key challenge of multiuser cooperative communication is how to design a cooperative mechanism to incentivize potential relay nodes to help a source node in its data transmission. In this paper, to address this problem, we apply a contract-based principal-agent framework to a cognitive-radio-based wireless relaying networks, in which a mobile relay node acts as the principal who designs Incentive Compatible (IC) and Individually Rational (IR) contract items, consisting of a set of rate-price pairs. Subsequently, contract items can be broadcast by a relay to nearby mobile users that want to send data. Once these sources optimally select a relay at the lowest cost and notify the contract items that they are willing to accept, the relay then chooses at least one source for which to provide service. Theoretical analysis and numerical results indicate that this pricing mechanism can lead to a win-win situation in which source nodes get good communication service and relay nodes maximize their own profit that can be used to purchase the relay service of other nodes when needed in the future.

AB - Multiuser cooperative communication significantly improves the performance of wireless communication networks. One key challenge of multiuser cooperative communication is how to design a cooperative mechanism to incentivize potential relay nodes to help a source node in its data transmission. In this paper, to address this problem, we apply a contract-based principal-agent framework to a cognitive-radio-based wireless relaying networks, in which a mobile relay node acts as the principal who designs Incentive Compatible (IC) and Individually Rational (IR) contract items, consisting of a set of rate-price pairs. Subsequently, contract items can be broadcast by a relay to nearby mobile users that want to send data. Once these sources optimally select a relay at the lowest cost and notify the contract items that they are willing to accept, the relay then chooses at least one source for which to provide service. Theoretical analysis and numerical results indicate that this pricing mechanism can lead to a win-win situation in which source nodes get good communication service and relay nodes maximize their own profit that can be used to purchase the relay service of other nodes when needed in the future.

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Contract theory for incentive mechanism design in cooperative relaying networks

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