Contract theory for incentive mechanism design in cooperative relaying networks

Yinshan Liu, Xiaofeng Zhong, Yang Yan, Jing Wang, Walid Saad

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingConference contribution


Multiuser cooperative communication significantly improves the performance of wireless communication networks. One key challenge of multiuser cooperative communication is how to design a cooperative mechanism to incentivize potential relay nodes to help a source node in its data transmission. In this paper, to address this problem, we apply a contract-based principal-agent framework to a cognitive-radio-based wireless relaying networks, in which a mobile relay node acts as the principal who designs Incentive Compatible (IC) and Individually Rational (IR) contract items, consisting of a set of rate-price pairs. Subsequently, contract items can be broadcast by a relay to nearby mobile users that want to send data. Once these sources optimally select a relay at the lowest cost and notify the contract items that they are willing to accept, the relay then chooses at least one source for which to provide service. Theoretical analysis and numerical results indicate that this pricing mechanism can lead to a win-win situation in which source nodes get good communication service and relay nodes maximize their own profit that can be used to purchase the relay service of other nodes when needed in the future.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Title of host publicationWireless Algorithms, Systems and Applications - 9th International Conference, WASA 2014, Proceedings
EditorsZhipeng Cai, Chaokun Wang, Siyao Cheng, Hongzhi Wang, Hong Gao
PublisherSpringer Verlag
Number of pages11
ISBN (Electronic)9783319077819
StatePublished - 2014
Event9th International Conference on Wireless Algorithms, Systems and Applications, WASA 2014 - Harbin, China
Duration: Jun 23 2014Jun 25 2014

Publication series

NameLecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics)
ISSN (Print)0302-9743
ISSN (Electronic)1611-3349


Other9th International Conference on Wireless Algorithms, Systems and Applications, WASA 2014


  • Contract theory
  • Cooperative communication
  • Incentive mechanism
  • Relaying networks

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Computer Science(all)
  • Theoretical Computer Science


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