Conscious vision for action versus unconscious vision for action?

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

28 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

David Milner and Melvyn Goodale's dissociation hypothesis is commonly taken to state that there are two functionally specialized cortical streams of visual processing originating in striate (V1) cortex: a dorsal, action-related "unconscious" stream and a ventral, perception-related "conscious" stream. As Milner and Goodale acknowledge, findings from blindsight studies suggest a more sophisticated picture that replaces the distinction between unconscious vision for action and conscious vision for perception with a tripartite division between unconscious vision for action, conscious vision for perception, and unconscious vision for perception. The combination excluded by the tripartite division is the possibility of conscious vision for action. But are there good grounds for concluding that there is no conscious vision for action? There is now overwhelming evidence that illusions and perceived size can have a significant effect on action (Bruno & Franz, 2009; Dassonville & Bala, 2004; Franz & Gegenfurtner, 2008; McIntosh & Lashley, 2008). There is also suggestive evidence that any sophisticated visual behavior requires collaboration between the two visual streams at every stage of the process (Schenk & McIntosh, 2010). I nonetheless want to make a case for the tripartite division between unconscious vision for action, conscious vision for perception, and unconscious vision for perception. My aim here is not to refute the evidence showing that conscious vision can affect action but rather to argue (a) that we cannot gain cognitive access to action-guiding dorsal stream representations, and (b) that these representations do not correlate with phenomenal consciousness. This vindicates the semi-conservative view that the dissociation hypothesis is best understood as a tripartite division.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Pages (from-to)1076-1104
Number of pages29
JournalCognitive Science
Volume35
Issue number6
DOIs
StatePublished - Aug 2011
Externally publishedYes

Fingerprint

Processing
Unconscious (Psychology)
Conscious
Visual Cortex
Consciousness
Dissociation

Keywords

  • Blindsight
  • Color processing
  • Consciousness
  • Dorsal stream
  • Enactive theory of perception
  • Perception
  • Shape processing
  • Unconscious vision
  • Ventral stream
  • Vision for action
  • Vision for perception

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Language and Linguistics
  • Artificial Intelligence
  • Cognitive Neuroscience
  • Experimental and Cognitive Psychology

Cite this

Conscious vision for action versus unconscious vision for action? / Brogaard, Berit.

In: Cognitive Science, Vol. 35, No. 6, 08.2011, p. 1076-1104.

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

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