Connectionism and the language of thought

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

2 Scopus citations

Abstract

In an influential critique, Jerry Fodor and Zenon Pylyshyn point to the existence of a potentially devastating dilemma for connectionism (Fodor and Pylyshyn [1988]). Either connectionist models consist in mere associations of unstructured representations, or they consist in processes involving complex representations. If the former, connectionism is mere associationism, and will not be capable of accounting for very much of cognition. If the latter, then connectionist models concern only the implementation of cognitive processes, and are, therefore, not informative at the level of cognition. I shall argue that Fodor and Pylyshyn's argument is based on a crucial misunderstanding, the same misunderstanding which motivates the entire language of thought hypothesis.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Pages (from-to)485-503
Number of pages19
JournalBritish Journal for the Philosophy of Science
Volume45
Issue number2
DOIs
StatePublished - Jun 1 1994
Externally publishedYes

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • History
  • Philosophy
  • History and Philosophy of Science

Fingerprint Dive into the research topics of 'Connectionism and the language of thought'. Together they form a unique fingerprint.

  • Cite this