Abstract
In an influential critique, Jerry Fodor and Zenon Pylyshyn point to the existence of a potentially devastating dilemma for connectionism (Fodor and Pylyshyn [1988]). Either connectionist models consist in mere associations of unstructured representations, or they consist in processes involving complex representations. If the former, connectionism is mere associationism, and will not be capable of accounting for very much of cognition. If the latter, then connectionist models concern only the implementation of cognitive processes, and are, therefore, not informative at the level of cognition. I shall argue that Fodor and Pylyshyn's argument is based on a crucial misunderstanding, the same misunderstanding which motivates the entire language of thought hypothesis.
| Original language | English (US) |
|---|---|
| Pages (from-to) | 485-503 |
| Number of pages | 19 |
| Journal | British Journal for the Philosophy of Science |
| Volume | 45 |
| Issue number | 2 |
| DOIs | |
| State | Published - Jun 1994 |
| Externally published | Yes |
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ASJC Scopus subject areas
- Molecular Biology
- Statistics and Probability
- Computational Mathematics
- Condensed Matter Physics
- History
- History and Philosophy of Science
- Philosophy
Cite this
Connectionism and the language of thought. / Rowlands, Mark.
In: British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, Vol. 45, No. 2, 06.1994, p. 485-503.Research output: Contribution to journal › Article
}
TY - JOUR
T1 - Connectionism and the language of thought
AU - Rowlands, Mark
PY - 1994/6
Y1 - 1994/6
N2 - In an influential critique, Jerry Fodor and Zenon Pylyshyn point to the existence of a potentially devastating dilemma for connectionism (Fodor and Pylyshyn [1988]). Either connectionist models consist in mere associations of unstructured representations, or they consist in processes involving complex representations. If the former, connectionism is mere associationism, and will not be capable of accounting for very much of cognition. If the latter, then connectionist models concern only the implementation of cognitive processes, and are, therefore, not informative at the level of cognition. I shall argue that Fodor and Pylyshyn's argument is based on a crucial misunderstanding, the same misunderstanding which motivates the entire language of thought hypothesis.
AB - In an influential critique, Jerry Fodor and Zenon Pylyshyn point to the existence of a potentially devastating dilemma for connectionism (Fodor and Pylyshyn [1988]). Either connectionist models consist in mere associations of unstructured representations, or they consist in processes involving complex representations. If the former, connectionism is mere associationism, and will not be capable of accounting for very much of cognition. If the latter, then connectionist models concern only the implementation of cognitive processes, and are, therefore, not informative at the level of cognition. I shall argue that Fodor and Pylyshyn's argument is based on a crucial misunderstanding, the same misunderstanding which motivates the entire language of thought hypothesis.
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UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/citedby.url?scp=58349089683&partnerID=8YFLogxK
U2 - 10.1093/bjps/45.2.485
DO - 10.1093/bjps/45.2.485
M3 - Article
VL - 45
SP - 485
EP - 503
JO - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science
JF - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science
SN - 0007-0882
IS - 2
ER -