Competition in femtocell networks

Strategic access policies in the uplink

Ali Khanafer, Walid Saad, Tamer Başar, Mérouane Debbah

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingConference contribution

7 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

In emerging small cell wireless, each femtocell access point (FAP) can either service its home subscribers exclusively (i.e., closed access) or open its access to accommodate a number of macrocell users so as to reduce cross-tier interference. In this paper, we propose a game-theoretic framework that enables the FAPs to strategically decide on their uplink access policy. We formulate a noncooperative game in which the FAPs are the players that want to strategically decide on whether to use a closed or an open access policy in order to maximize the performance of their registered users. Each FAP aims at optimizing the tradeoff between reducing cross-tier interference, by admitting macrocell users, and the associated cost in terms of allocated resources. Using novel analytical techniques, we show that the game always admits a pure strategy Nash equilibrium, despite the discontinuities in the utility functions. Further, we propose a distributed algorithm that can be adopted by the FAPs to reach their equilibrium access policies. Simulation results show that the proposed algorithm provides an improvement of 85.4% relative to an optimized open access scheme in the average worst-case FAP utility.

Original languageEnglish
Title of host publicationIEEE International Conference on Communications
Pages5070-5074
Number of pages5
DOIs
StatePublished - Dec 1 2012
Event2012 IEEE International Conference on Communications, ICC 2012 - Ottawa, ON, Canada
Duration: Jun 10 2012Jun 15 2012

Other

Other2012 IEEE International Conference on Communications, ICC 2012
CountryCanada
CityOttawa, ON
Period6/10/126/15/12

Fingerprint

Femtocell
Parallel algorithms
Costs

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Electrical and Electronic Engineering
  • Computer Networks and Communications

Cite this

Khanafer, A., Saad, W., Başar, T., & Debbah, M. (2012). Competition in femtocell networks: Strategic access policies in the uplink. In IEEE International Conference on Communications (pp. 5070-5074). [6364563] https://doi.org/10.1109/ICC.2012.6364563

Competition in femtocell networks : Strategic access policies in the uplink. / Khanafer, Ali; Saad, Walid; Başar, Tamer; Debbah, Mérouane.

IEEE International Conference on Communications. 2012. p. 5070-5074 6364563.

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingConference contribution

Khanafer, A, Saad, W, Başar, T & Debbah, M 2012, Competition in femtocell networks: Strategic access policies in the uplink. in IEEE International Conference on Communications., 6364563, pp. 5070-5074, 2012 IEEE International Conference on Communications, ICC 2012, Ottawa, ON, Canada, 6/10/12. https://doi.org/10.1109/ICC.2012.6364563
Khanafer A, Saad W, Başar T, Debbah M. Competition in femtocell networks: Strategic access policies in the uplink. In IEEE International Conference on Communications. 2012. p. 5070-5074. 6364563 https://doi.org/10.1109/ICC.2012.6364563
Khanafer, Ali ; Saad, Walid ; Başar, Tamer ; Debbah, Mérouane. / Competition in femtocell networks : Strategic access policies in the uplink. IEEE International Conference on Communications. 2012. pp. 5070-5074
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