Cognitive penetrability and high-level properties in perception: Unrelated phenomena?

Berit Brogaard, Bartek Chomanski

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

9 Scopus citations

Abstract

There has been a recent surge in interest in two questions concerning the nature of perceptual experience; viz. the question of whether perceptual experience is sometimes cognitively penetrated and that of whether high-level properties are presented in perceptual experience. Only rarely have thinkers been concerned with the question of whether the two phenomena are interestingly related. Here we argue that the two phenomena are not related in any interesting way. We argue further that this lack of an interesting connection between the two phenomena has potentially devastating consequences for naïve realism. Finally, we consider the possibility of a disunified view of experience that takes perceptual experience to be a matter of both being directly perceptually related to mind-independent objects and property instances as well as consciously representing these entities.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Pages (from-to)469-486
Number of pages18
JournalPacific Philosophical Quarterly
Volume96
Issue number4
DOIs
StatePublished - Dec 1 2015

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ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Philosophy

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