Coalitional game theory for security risk management

Walid Saad, Tansu Alpcan, Tamer Başar, Are Hjørungnes

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingConference contribution

15 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

Quantitative models for security risk management in organizations are recently receiving an increased attention in the research community. This paper investigates the possibility of cooperation among autonomous divisions of an organization with dependent security assets and/or vulnerabilities for reducing overall security risks. A coalitional game is formulated for modeling cooperation possibilities among these divisions based on their both positive (synergies) and negative (vulnerabilities) interdependencies. The proposed game constitutes a framework that allows to investigate how an organization can maximize its total utility through cooperation among its different divisions. The introduced utility accounts for the gains from cooperation, in terms of an improved synergy among the divisions, and the costs for cooperation that account for the friction among the divisions (e.g. due to social and human factors) as well as the difficulty of managing large-sized divisions. Using the proposed game model, the illustrative cases of two-coalition cooperation, twodivision cooperation as well as a practical scenario when using an ideal cooperation protocol are analyzed.

Original languageEnglish
Title of host publication5th International Conference on Internet Monitoring and Protection, ICIMP 2010
Pages35-40
Number of pages6
DOIs
StatePublished - Jul 16 2010
Event5th International Conference on Internet Monitoring and Protection, ICIMP 2010 - Barcelona, Spain
Duration: May 9 2010May 15 2010

Other

Other5th International Conference on Internet Monitoring and Protection, ICIMP 2010
CountrySpain
CityBarcelona
Period5/9/105/15/10

Fingerprint

Game theory
Risk management
Human engineering
Friction
Costs

Keywords

  • Coalitional game theory
  • Game theory
  • Risk management
  • Security

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Computer Networks and Communications

Cite this

Saad, W., Alpcan, T., Başar, T., & Hjørungnes, A. (2010). Coalitional game theory for security risk management. In 5th International Conference on Internet Monitoring and Protection, ICIMP 2010 (pp. 35-40). [5476894] https://doi.org/10.1109/ICIMP.2010.14

Coalitional game theory for security risk management. / Saad, Walid; Alpcan, Tansu; Başar, Tamer; Hjørungnes, Are.

5th International Conference on Internet Monitoring and Protection, ICIMP 2010. 2010. p. 35-40 5476894.

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingConference contribution

Saad, W, Alpcan, T, Başar, T & Hjørungnes, A 2010, Coalitional game theory for security risk management. in 5th International Conference on Internet Monitoring and Protection, ICIMP 2010., 5476894, pp. 35-40, 5th International Conference on Internet Monitoring and Protection, ICIMP 2010, Barcelona, Spain, 5/9/10. https://doi.org/10.1109/ICIMP.2010.14
Saad W, Alpcan T, Başar T, Hjørungnes A. Coalitional game theory for security risk management. In 5th International Conference on Internet Monitoring and Protection, ICIMP 2010. 2010. p. 35-40. 5476894 https://doi.org/10.1109/ICIMP.2010.14
Saad, Walid ; Alpcan, Tansu ; Başar, Tamer ; Hjørungnes, Are. / Coalitional game theory for security risk management. 5th International Conference on Internet Monitoring and Protection, ICIMP 2010. 2010. pp. 35-40
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