Coalition formation games for collaborative spectrum sensing

Walid Saad, Zhu Han, Tamer Başar, Mérouane Debbah, Are Hjørungnes

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

83 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

Collaborative spectrum sensing (CSS) between secondary users (SUs) in cognitive networks exhibits an inherent tradeoff between minimizing the probability of missing the detection of the primary user (PU) and maintaining a reasonable false alarm probability (e.g., for maintaining good spectrum utilization). In this paper, we study the impact of this tradeoff on the network structure and the cooperative incentives of the SUs that seek to cooperate to improve their detection performance. We model the CSS problem as a nontransferable coalitional game, and we propose distributed algorithms for coalition formation (CF). First, we construct a distributed CF algorithm that allows the SUs to self-organize into disjoint coalitions while accounting for the CSS tradeoff. Then, the CF algorithm is complemented with a coalitional voting game to enable distributed CF with detection probability (CF-PD) guarantees when required by the PU. The CF-PD algorithm allows the SUs to form minimal winning coalitions (MWCs), i.e., coalitions that achieve the target detection probability with minimal costs. For both algorithms, we study and prove various properties pertaining to network structure, adaptation to mobility, and stability. Simulation results show that CF reduces the average probability of miss per SU up to 88.45%, relative to the noncooperative case, while maintaining a desired false alarm. For CF-PD, the results show that up to 87.25% of the SUs achieve the required detection probability through MWCs.

Original languageEnglish
Article number5607318
Pages (from-to)276-297
Number of pages22
JournalIEEE Transactions on Vehicular Technology
Volume60
Issue number1
DOIs
StatePublished - Jan 1 2011

Fingerprint

Coalition Formation
Spectrum Sensing
Game
Coalitions
Detection Probability
Trade-offs
False Alarm
Network Structure
Coalitional Games
Target tracking
Parallel algorithms
Target Detection
Distributed Algorithms
Incentives
Voting
Disjoint
Costs

Keywords

  • Coalitional game
  • cognitive radio
  • collaborative sensing
  • game theory
  • spectrum sensing

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Electrical and Electronic Engineering
  • Aerospace Engineering
  • Automotive Engineering
  • Computer Networks and Communications
  • Applied Mathematics

Cite this

Saad, W., Han, Z., Başar, T., Debbah, M., & Hjørungnes, A. (2011). Coalition formation games for collaborative spectrum sensing. IEEE Transactions on Vehicular Technology, 60(1), 276-297. [5607318]. https://doi.org/10.1109/TVT.2010.2089477

Coalition formation games for collaborative spectrum sensing. / Saad, Walid; Han, Zhu; Başar, Tamer; Debbah, Mérouane; Hjørungnes, Are.

In: IEEE Transactions on Vehicular Technology, Vol. 60, No. 1, 5607318, 01.01.2011, p. 276-297.

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

Saad, W, Han, Z, Başar, T, Debbah, M & Hjørungnes, A 2011, 'Coalition formation games for collaborative spectrum sensing', IEEE Transactions on Vehicular Technology, vol. 60, no. 1, 5607318, pp. 276-297. https://doi.org/10.1109/TVT.2010.2089477
Saad, Walid ; Han, Zhu ; Başar, Tamer ; Debbah, Mérouane ; Hjørungnes, Are. / Coalition formation games for collaborative spectrum sensing. In: IEEE Transactions on Vehicular Technology. 2011 ; Vol. 60, No. 1. pp. 276-297.
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